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THE MEXICA1 ARMY AND THE STATE . HISTOntCAL 
AND POLlT TCAf. PERSPECTJVE { .. ) 
Panoram a of fb-., Theme 
Sludies abouL contempora ry history of MeXJco are dom1· 
n•ted by analyses oí ,he civil socie,y's componcois: thc govern-
ment ,party in it.'i Jong metamo ,'Phosis, non~government parties, 
worker and peasant trode unions . both official and of o¡,posi· 
tion , etc. Mcxico's Army as a fundamental mgrccüem oí the 
political society has been relega 1ed 10 a secondary position as 
an object of study; in conscquence . rJ,e dialectic.al unity of civil 
society-political society (which together make up the State) has 
receiv~d little •ttention, historically speaking as well as in re-
cent rimes. Tbís situahon responds partially to the fact tha t in 
Mex.ico (in conu ·ast to many latin american nations) ideological-
political elen,ents prcdomjna Led over those. of n coercive nature 
in controling the non-ruling classes; even so, in addhion 10 the 
Army's 1mportant functions in organizing the Siate's apparatus 
9f cousensu.s and adminJstration, tbis in.stitution's services of 
compu ls.ion in the first half of r.his c:en1ury wcre considerab le (').. 
( •) Rt:.ka.rc.h Asslstaot ot lostJcuto de ltJveitipcionC$ Sod..tlC!i, Un.iver61u.lad 
Nacional Autónoma de Mtx1ct>. 
I (* .. ) Synt:hes.is of thc aulhor 's lhc.<;is• • U [IUlclóo y d J)Ottncil! PolÍOCO del eje:rrjto mexicano : ¡>asadú y pro~nie •, S<'uoJ• di Peric-iionAll)C'OIO U) Socíoloain. 
Uniw:rsíty of Rome. Tr•nslatcd by: Cat.M:rin,e C, NeJso.n 
(1) A profoUDd formul11tion co.oce.rnioa the veeulbrltJes r,f Third World 
struc1ures o( modlation and _:producdon can be rou.od in; Rottt Buua , El 
Podt.r Dt.spdti.ca Bur1u.U, Bd. Pe.nín$\.lU, B,rotlo.o:a "1977. Fot the specfAUUy 
noUdcal a.spcct, sce:: t.hc ch2pter ~nútlcd • Camp,tSinAdo y pc,der 1nediador •; 
for ih,e fCOnomic: .. Economía camp,esi.n~.:rooduna y artkulactOn de lo1i modos 
de J)NXh,K:c:iÓD • , 
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Howcver, the.-e are a rcduced numbet of studies about tbe 
me.'Ocan armed institu rion whicb con be divided into two bnsic 
groups: one consists of the official and exLra-official literature 
which preseut it as a « popular and revolutiona.ry • organi:i.ation 
(arising from the • sui generis • Stare of the Me;cican Revolu 
tion) prnsently transformed into an , apolitical • unit because 
of its incrcasmg professionalization, ínterprctBt1on whlch has 
served as a point of agreement for both national and north 
an1erican researchers, such as Loz.oya and Lieuwcu (1 ). • Pro-
fessiooalization = Apolitization , . The latin american armed 
forces most bighly praised for their • professionalism and con· 
sti tutional respecl • were lhe chilean; these now oífer the most 
re.nowned, bloody example of exactly the oppositc. Secondly , 
lherc are certain expcrts who recognite that lhc Army present· 
ly h,u; a.n undeniabJe politicaJ role; most representative of this 
group are Rondfeldt and Margiorta ('). Both of these authors 
· represen, a deflnite analítica! improvemen, ín comparison to 
Weuwen, who tends to be descriptive ond anccdotical; however, 
at tbe end of his a.,'ticle Rondfeldt finisbes by introdudng the 
famous • apoliticizíng • military professionaliuaion a., part of 
bis hypothesis . Margiotta also elaborares a model of « mi!ita ry 
non·intervention • based on severa! obvious supposjtions: cons-
s-tant cooptalion and distribution of hígh positious to a militnry 
<,lite, ab5'm5e of guernllla warfare on ,a large SC'.ile, adcquate fringe 
bencfiLs and salaries, etc. Unfortunatcly. i1 seems tha.t models of 
a strong weberian tint (ideal types) never go out of style . Even 
so, none of tnese models can explain the real profound reasorc< 
for an incrf.ase or decrease in the militia's presence within tbe 
Stare· nr.>t all military intervcntions have che same historical 
cla~-s sigo nor are tbey per se negative. 
(2,) Jo~ A. Lo1.oya, El Eilr'Gito J.tex,ioonr,: 1910.196$ . .El Colcaio dt M~ico . 
Mbico, D.F. 1970. E.ch~1n Llt'i'tl\lo'en, Mtttican Mililari.sm . 1910-1940: Tic~ PolltitJtJl 
Rist. and Fa1' o( the Rtvolutinnary A"my. Tbc: Un.ivenley of New MC!xieo Pra$. 
Alburquerqu.e, N M 1-968. Frederkk C. Tum.e:r, • M#~ioo: tu cawn.!i de .la HmJ, 
ta,Qón mHJtu • in Aportes. No 6 Octut)er, J968. 
(J) DaV1d Rondfcldt, • The Mcxic:an Anny and Polit.lul Order shxe 1P40 •· 
Tbe Rand Corponadon, 1973. Fnmklin D. Mar¡wtta, • CivllJan Con1tol ot t.M 
Mil1tary : Pattein.,;; in Mcñco •, M:usachusetts .Jnstitu1.t ol TechnoJor:y and Ah 
Comma.nd Staff Collqe , 1975. 
Anothe r scholar gocs even farther tho.n u,e two groups al-
ready mentioned and u.oderllncs the obvious class character of 
Mexico's müitary body ('). Bcnls developes some intcrestmg 
ideas both about the Army wilhin the polilicnl systcm o..s well 
as abom lmperialis m's military assistenc.e ro it, but he insists 
on including his analysis within a gene,·al scheme of depcnden -
tism . Even though he trie s to point out Mexíco's specif:icity 
with respect to other latin american cou.ntries, h.is scarcc cm· 
pirical dala (a must for c.onstructing scientific sociology) and bis 
lack uf definition or unúe rstandlng of our nation's undeniable 
ltistoricaUy dependent character, makc ll possible for him to 
sustain: {lt Latjn An1eriea 's dependent capitalist developmenl Ul· 
eludes all aspects, even lhe mili tary _ thc mexic:m armed forces 
are. submítted to the influences of the American imperiali st 
inte1ests . This influ<'",.rh::e is ttOl condit,oning or determittant ... 
but we m1Lst cmphasize its prcs.ence, ,vh1ch in other concütions 
could becom e fundamental • ('). Obvio1Jsly, his fü,st enormous 
error is to confuse what is deterntinanr. \vith whal is conditionaJ, 
but the absurd thing is to affirm thal Impeeialism is neit her 
onc nor the ott,er, an affirmallon which would seem to ind.icate 
that it didn't exist, cven though be declares that in a specific 
future momcnt , there could erist o possiblliry of thc • externa) • 
becomi.ag of fundam ent al impor1anco Wc con.sider that lmpo-
rialism's influen ce c:ertaill'.ly conform s a condit ioning factor jn any 
dependent society, but its presence alone is not sullicie.n t to 
explain or a.nalyze transfonr,ations of socio-pollricaJ roles playcd 
~y the armed fort.'CS in • resolving • social confücts; we shal l show 
how these las1 are the motive for such transformations and no, 
tbe mtlita,y aid and depeodency of imperiahsm ('), 
To sumroarize, aJJ previou•ly mentioned interpret.atlons con· 
tain importan, restrictions for understanding both tbe armed 
instltute's chang-ing participation in nalional politics, as welJ as 
(.f) GuiU("nno BoW I Lo.i ,nilit«ru y la ¡,o/frica m Mbiro: 19151914, Ed. l!J 
C&bolllto, M<!xico D.F. 1975, 
(5) /bid., p. 167, ilalks add<d. 
(6} Th• 1n.&ufficiet1e« of depcndent.ism ln the anafy&1s of both t.bc historicat 
o.nd ~ ~pccllic in 01JI contine:nt is cliscti.sR'd &t lc::otth io tbe. apociaJ numbtrr 
of H1r-toN12 y Soc.iednd: re11~ltt luti.n"4lmeric.vua d• pettlami«1110 ma~iSlo, No. S. 
Sprin.1, 197, : .. Modos de producción en América Laclna • . 
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th< real signifle.1nce of tfae American Union's inilita·ry aid wlth 
rcspect ro lhis parricipation ('). 
Marxist s<Jdologists have widc,c,,limated thc Army a$ an 
ol,ject of study, espocially witl, respect to its not oeccssarily 
cocrcive function insidc the civil society and Lo U.S. impcríalism·~ 
1nflue1,ce on it . There is no doubt that an 1mportam k.ey to 
understand ing Mexlco's prolonged political stabiliry (highly 
pr.ri6e<l by s~aiesmen a:n<I intelloc,uals, bO(h namonal and foreign) 
resides in the peculiar cristaliwtion of 1he • modus vivendi • 
which eJtists between the civil and polit.ical soc:iety; a cristali1.a-
tlon understood not only as material conc.essions of civilians 10 
their n1ilitary counterparts, but also as an interacting net,vork 
of ideological, ecooom.ic nnd cultural factors in a given histor· 
ical perspeci-íve. Latín American mihtarism has a stric.t relation 
not onJy with our persistent productive crises but also wirJ, 
specific characteristics at the superstructural level. Mcxír.o's 
long stability l• cxplained oot only by a continued economic 
growth but also by the mann~r in whích the State • coaF:Wat· 
ed •; to mention the econon1ic &j1uat.ion as the only expHcative 
factor is not enough : it should be sufficienl to remember that 
, Me,cico has one of tbe most unequal distributions o! mcome of 
our continent. 
(7) SeV<"ral studies do not ¡o bcyun;J a. .subd> 11polo¡etic-, narrativc dts-
cription of th• Latin A-merlC.'1,0 ann1es anri Pc.utaaon's 1nterrVJltions llhhouah 
thcy Btllibutc to t.be U.S. Deferue l>cpaJ·tJ"l'.M:ot the responsab1l1ty for milliarl.sm in 
1he southem hem-bp~. bo,vevcr, in conolu,ion t.b,e.)' n,oommeud cootinued 
a.rneriean mtut.Ary iüd l(I dic.tJ1orship.i confronted wilh a • communl.s.1 • threat. 
Bdwin LJauwen, Gett8rt:de:t oon,ro Prtsidentu e:n Amirlco 1...4.tina. Ed. ,Sl¡lo 
Vctn1e, o ·ueoos Al.res, 196.S. Ib1'd, • The Latin Amuicao Mihtnry •. Commftt-ce 
on Fore:lan Relatlons, u.s. Sc:nate, \Vathln.-ton, D.C. 1967 Rob~rt C. Cav, • El 
entrenamJento de milita.res Jatlnoan1erlcano!o en Jos llstados Unidos; el _pa_pc:J 
M>Qal de l.a1 Fuerza.9 ArmjdJS •. ln A.p0r1es, No. 6. Other in\'C.Stl¡a.t~ons .bMed 
on lhe vuJpr interprctati\!e scheme of cause and effcet try to a,:plain milltary 
intcneotloniscn's orlein e.od. modahtie., by comparin¡ the pen;;:itTlt of tbe mJIJ. 
tary budaet in tr:nn.s of the national budact or ol the aross natiunal ptoduct. 
c,r in tcnn, of otbr.r iúdicators such as: pet eapna in.coine, de¡ree: ot likraey , 
etc. Fnr a weU í<Jtmdcd rcjcction of $Ucll pooitf()('J, as wdJ al ror • $f:rJes o( 
sdmulatin¡ hypothe:K.s, see: Manfr«l Kossok, • l'olencialidadcs y Li.miudones 
tn el eambto de 111 función p01ftico-s~ial de las F~.AA. cu . Jos patsei !~ desa-
rro11o: d caso de A.merica Laú.na • , in Revista ·LAtl',"X",~.rtUna 41! S~c, g~«, 
Vol. VII, No. 2-J, JuJ .. $ep. 1971: e.he samc ank:le:aJ)pears 1n: Juurnnl ot·f,uera , 
niertcatt Stu.dl..s and World A/fair &, VoJ. XIV, No. 4, Nov . 1972. 
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lt is t.herefore impo,sible to advaoce in the understancling 
of a cornplicated phenome.non such as militarism if it is con-
sidered to be a mechanical relle c t1on of the material structure's 
problems and even less if ít is chougbt of as a simple sitwit,on 
,vhere tJ1e alte..rnate or simultaneou...-. presence of violl!'.noe 11Dd 
consens-us are evaluated as p1oducts of North Am~rica'~ plans 
ond t.hosc of its unconditional latín americen ollies. However, there 
is no doubt that specilic impe.rialistic stra1egies for each coflt.inent, 
country ar e\len zones of {\OC nat.ion do exist. But the&e slrategies 
and their con·es ponding tactics (econom ic, cult ural , military, 
etc.) do not enter with ease in any underdeveloped socio-econo-
mic formation (or for tha , matter in any fomiation). There is 
always a cerlain degree of rejection whltb vnries according to 
tl,e specificity of each format,on . This degree of rejc ctlon, or 
bctter yet, thc « mode of reception » (") of impcriaH sm's pre-
sence, should be exiunmed both bistorically speaking and wit h 
respect to spec:ific sicuations. ln other words, econom.ic: depen-
dence is not an elcmeot which determines but ratber conditíons 
rhe class slruggle a11d the correlation o[ forces 1vithin eacb class . 
ln synthes,s. wbcn faced with an acule socio-poütical con-
text, it is absolutely necessary to consider, first of ali , the equi· 
Jibrlum of internal forces (class front withln unions, political 
patties, the Army, etc.) and secondly those international ones : 
the position of the USSR and other socialist camp governmenLs 
(as bemg those ruling blocks most conseque.nt in terms of pro 
!etariat iniernationalism) and that of Norlh America (and of 
its work.iog class, which is not nec.ossarily oondcmned • ad per-
petum » to cooperaung w1th the bourgeo is ie); 1hat of Europe , 
considered as a conglomtrate o[ governrocnls in wbich a strong 
• euror..01nn1unist style • working class or e.ven that of ::i social· 
(8) For more deWJ abou1 this notion sce: Re.ni 7.a-valr:ta Merr..ado, • Movi· 
miento obrero y cleoctA social•, in Huto,14 y Sociedad. No. 3, Autunt.n 1974. 
A aen~ral Ot.itUne C*n be roond in Au¡ust:Cn Cue\111, • Ptoblcmas 1 penpoelMS 
de 111 1eorla d~ l& d~nd.t1'1Cia • and Fernando Arauoo, • Ob.se.n•aciones ct1 torno 
a ta dial6clica de la dcp".Jtdcn(-.ia •, in Jbid. Zavalct.a. sustalns • .,. n1os1 atteodon 
h~ betn paid to tbe moment of ardval of thc met.topoUs' dlf(oreot pluses or 
eapitalism to periphr:1al nountrics (wheu a \\!Orld CGOOOll\Y Mteadv txists) and 
not to lhe mnde ni rr,.c,:plio11 Q/ this phasc wtdch (s, in our opinton the 
funda.mental a.s¡,c·ct of thal oompllc•ted union (or modes of prodoction), t.h.lt 
which sets the too~ nf o.oe tyve of u.ndetdevelop.me:nt or anot.ber •, op. c{L 
• Movimiento ... •· 
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democra.lic natnre n1akcs its presence fe1t, and of cour.se. thoso 
revolutionary proccsses taking place in the misnomererl • Third 
World• ('). 'fo locate l.be real weight of eac.h one of 1hese ele• 
mr.nts is ess.ential in order to elabora.te scient ific formuJat.ions 
and make objective political propositions . 
At Lhc beginniag of this dccade. Manfrcd Kosso k called our 
at1r.n1io11 to the lack of ser ious studies about faún american 
militarlsm (" ). As íar as we know. his observation is st i,!! valid, 
a, Jeast with respect 10 Mexico. An analysis of Lhe organiwtioo, 
h.tnctioning, 1ransforma tions 1 tendencies, potencialities. and so--
r.io,polítícal limit;nions of the Army wilhin the State and super· 
struct ural realm, as 'i.vcll as in the econo1nic area, constitutes a 
rnsk still to be accomplised for Mexico and secmingly far all 
Latín America . We hope that Lhis artkJe makes a contribution 
1owards under s tanding the mexica.n military question both hl· 
stoncaUy and at the presen t. 
Our central objecLive consists finst in making a panoramic 
pre'se.ntation of the Anny a!i a c:ardinaJ organi1.ation in Lhe con· 
formation of Mexico's modern Slate and as a backup institulion 
of the official pany, whjch in turn occupies a great portion of 
the civil society; we wiJJ effoc.t sccondly, a detrulcd projoction 
of cerlaio profound professional changes which llave occurred 
(9) Au tx.otllent study u1\dcrHnr.s Norlb lu)lcri.:a's role and its restt·lc-tions 
111 ~J)"!ciric i:ituation~ in BoUviA In 19:'12 and 1971, u wtJJ ...s tbc intt"-rnal oontext 
of rhue samr hlttetlical momenu;. Op. Cit. Zavaleta noJ lb ld El p13(Jer /JUJ1l m 
An1irita la.ti.n.a, Ed. Si¡lo X.XI, M~ic:o . D.F. l97b. Anotbu text whicb co,itnlns 
obvkJus. conlr'Mts \\'lth thc :ibovf! mc:nuoncJ Is; Ou111enno Bedrcgal, Lo.s 1tuli· 
1ar-f's C!11 Bolivia, Ed . Es1emporáncos , Mb.lCO, J) F. 1974. 
{10)"' ... a «naln contndic:hon b'1s betti made ev1dent : on one h.and, thc 
number ot rublicadon.s reít'Trina: to the tittn a.rru¡.ric..n anned Corees' soclaJ 
-and potitical po:i.ltkln ha.s increascd rapid ly; on lbt: olhr.:r, hOWC\'et, thctt it 
an cbscru.e of global analyst'.$ whk.b, beyond givioa a dclailtd de.¡ctiptfon, 
oplain in a ,rus1,worthy manncr thi.S pheno1nCflon of ao incn:a.slna and cyclic.\l 
• milh..ai i.l.atjoo • of p,0Udcal lite, • ~rnc r.hlllncleri.,;tic of 1hb, ceoara,phl( 
re:gion. \Ve must poinl out that rese1rch coocornln¡ thJ.s ro le of the Latin 
An:,e:rjran Mil lta.ry b Ul tt critic:al slcu.ation, and dema.nd5 a n-consklen.tíon In 
ti¡b t of new c-rheri-a. 1'bis neoc.ssity ala.o re'presenu a startina -point f'>r a areater 
cornprumise by mar.xh,t authon • . Kossok, Op. Cit., p. 193. An intt:t-.,iina 
reflcctlon about me Armed Forces in Lalln Amcii'4\ u,ln.¡ ee-rtlln ele-ment, 
troJn OmmK i ~:od gcarcd 1owardJ n:duclDa tlm 1á1> 11 prescntod by Lwi Ru.e to 
ln. hls oontrlbutJon • Cl$S$l ~ e Fot-re Arma.te ln Ameri.ca Latina• JIUbllsbed 
i.n: F.P. Cct11se, L. Razeto, P. C.(>n,oü, Cltu.si e ~·ti.httiúni in America Latino, 
Carucci ocl., Roma 1V17, 
in the Army in answer to different forms of lhe class strugg le 
and as a nocessity of making it int o a bighly organized and 
c.:ohesive or2an.ization of Wolcnce \Yit.hin the State. Simultane· 
oosly, we will re"eaJ the importance whi<:h U.S. nillitary as-
sistance has played in tbose changes, as • source of organization-
al techniquc>s as well as of rrain ing and technicafonilitary equip · 
ment. We will underline a ,pecific interaction among: class 
stnrgg le-milit uy profess ionalization·military aid ol Jmperialísm. 
In politir.s, there art. o,úv nvo decisíve force.s: 
1hr. or¡a niz.ed -power of t~ Statt , that iJ tht Arm1 
and it ~ counlttrpart , tht!· unílrganittd , elr.nrcntary 
p<r,,4•er of tlie pqpular ,nassts . 
F. l:.NGBl.S 
J. - The Oomestlcotion ol the Wanlor, 
A. Pe.1·sptctive of rile first lessons and c(>nstquent ttsrs 
Alter the long civil war (19 10-1917) more commonly lmown 
as the Mexican Revolution, ít became absolutely necessary íor 
the oew-born ruJing class to complete the natfonal unification 
bot h in 1be economic and in the pohtic~l -ideologicnl sense . Dif-
ferent measures \\1er~ ta.ken to echieve l11c consummation of this 
difficu Jt task: the en1ission of a sing]e currency, thc r'dlitication 
of a uew c:onsti tution , th~ subst itu tfon of tho popular arnties by 
a pennanent and national one, etc. A lal'ge degree of agitatfon 
nnd violence accom panied this process of nacional unlficatioo. 
The bloody events of the • Deceno Tragica, (the Tragic Decade: 
1910·20) r<.>Jlected the con tra dictions oí thc diffe,·ent fractioM 
of the reccm ly formcd ruling class on one hnnd, and on the 
other, the pres~ce of the mnsse,s struggling for the rea\itation 
of their rights •~pressed in the new consti tut ion (obtained by 
means of constant pressure) as well a s in answer to the semi· 
general rep ress ion of the Army, cx~rcized roalnly against the 
peasants, l.be gra nd mnss of the populatio n. 
In such a way began an unequal battl e betwee n the peasan ts 
( who, to the cry of • lond and Jibcrty • demanded respect for 
their constituti onal and individual rights) and Lhe milit ia o[ t.he 
flowering bourgeois s tat e. The first grou p aske d for the fulfill-
117 
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rnent oí the promise,; for which it liad given its mass,ve parti-
cipation in thc past revolution ; the militia (pcasants in uniforml 
played the sad role of exéeutiuoers of tbe members of thcir own 
class ,vho ,~rere not content ,vith the « revolutionary ,. order and 
peace. The peasants and worker.s who a.cccpted this peGce played 
rhe same trag ic role of exocutioners (for e,rnmple: 1h11 workers of 
the Red Batall ious agai.ost the peasan1 1roops of Villa, the CROM, 
the olficia.l fede1,ation of tra<le unions, against the indcpendeut 
unions. etc.) serving as a check and balance tn the rebellious 
military unils . The situation descr ibed above graduall y turnod 
into a complicared mr.canisni of checks 41nd balances which in 
a general sense wo1 ked in t.his way: L.11e NatiOn.al Re,,olutionary 
Party (PNR) understood as the organin,d worker aod peasanl 
movement, 3gainst the Anny which was stUI a disunified body, 
likely to divide into rcbellious fracrion, (rep resenring rhe a-rnbi, 
t1ons of generals and of national anti sometimes inrernational 
intercsts of lhe ruling classes, usually the most reactionary); 
tbe use of these checks and balances made possible che defeat 
of all m:iin military uprisings ( 1924, 1929), rhe r.onhnuation of 
the projec1 of professionali.zation of the Army and the • dome-
stication • o( the worker and peasant movement, by means of 
rcpression or ideological manipulntion. 
After thc Decena Tragica. presiden! Gen Alvaro Obrng6n 
urdered measures to be take.n to fortify tho professional forn13 . 
tion of the Army and especially tCJ consolidate its permanent 
character. He wo,ked both among the rroops and in the top 
ranks, and was able to achieve: the m:,,~slve retirement from 
active duty of rnany peasants and the physical etimination of 
• caudillos• and WSContented ijene-rals or their cooptat jon into 
the ¡:rowlng bureaucratic bow·geois1e as well as 1.heir corruption 
by means of the famous • cannoo balls » or pay-<.>ffs of 50,000 
pesos. Others had already been incorportl.ted inlo the agra.rían 
bourgooisi e (11), or were in collusion with it, putting their troops 
al 1ts servicx. Gen. Plutarco Ellas Calles adopted decisivo mea· 
sures to professiona lize the mílitary wrps. In the decade of 
(1 1) ~aos,.Wcmer Tobler, • ~ Pnn.doja.r. del Ejl!:rcito R"'vo1ucJona.rio: ~'U 
P3pel Social en l::a Reforma Agraria ~\c:Jticana, J921).J935 •• lo 1/isto,-UJ Al•xiCQ1'1a 
Vol XXt. lul.,Sq, 1971, No. 1. 
1 
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Cálles (1924-1934) che basic military odu.::atio113J inrrastrueture 
was established, culminating in the creatio n of lhe Escueln Su-
pci;or de Guerra: Army General Stafl College (11) . 
During the dlctatorship of C31Jcs. certain other innc,vations 
were arhieved. including the fonnation of the ideological-politic:al 
superstructure (fou11dation of the Parcido Nac.ional Revoluc.iona· 
rio: PNR) and others of an cconomic nature (crearion o! the 
Central Bank , establish ment of inrcrnatiunal línes of credit, etc.); 
but the most imporuinr socio-oconc,mic refom,s necessary for 
capitalist development would have to wait unlil tbe administra-
cion of Cárdenas (1935-40): for example, tbt Agrarian Reform 
(very essenlial) and Jarge works of infras truc-ture: construction 
of highways and system oí dams, etc. as well as furthcr improve-
m~nt of the idP.ological polltical instrument inherited from Cal-
les. In orde.r Lo be able to achieve these goals, Cárdenas ,ecurred 
10 thc tnasses uf workers and peasant s and to the Army. With 
the fom,er , be established alliances , made concessio ns. recognlz 
ed cenaio vic1ories but finally was able to submit them te> tite 
offictally controlled frade unions . Because he was held in great 
personal estedm, the president was able to use !he latler as a 
dike to contain rhe national and inrematioual fracttons of the 
bourgeoisie which de.monstrat.ed the n1ost conservative ottitudes 
towards the Agrarlan Reform and thc Expropriation .of Lhe Pe-
Lroleum lndustry, as well a, towards the gener:illy democtatic 
cUma,e prcsent in the counLry. Contrary 10 t.he pasL, when the 
system of checks and balances worked 10 offset the untrus1-
wor1hy military apparatus and the armed workers and peasaots, 
tbat is, when the combined forces of the popular masses and the 
loyal Army units mad~ it possible 10 clefeat the reac rionary clas-
ses group<,d behind rebellious geuerah: now, C'.árdena.• appeal-
.ed 10 both of thé&e unified groups as reliable State institutions. 
For the governmenl , 1his change represente d a show of con-
fidance. in the armed insfüu tfoli, for the bourgeoisie, its ide.nti, 
fication witb Lhe newl,om Slate and tl,erefore its acceptance of 
this same apparatus as an tntermed.iary not only witli 'r~spect to 
the dominated classes, but also in the evem of future conflkts 
. ( ..: . . 
(12) Ser:. • F.1 Ejtrr.ito Mcxtean"ó • J)U.blishe(I by, ~he Ocpartnumt of Qe"-n,t 
(Ser.retarla ~ la Defensa Naoional) in tbe edit.lon or CJ.CIUl<1r 17/JV/1S and 
Op. Cít.. l..o:lOya.,. p. -46. . ' • , 
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within i:hc rulíng class i1.self. Ali of this was made poss.ible 
thanks to tbe conlrol and incorporation of the worker anti pea-
sant movemen, within the PNR and 10 the technical-organiza 
tional and ideological professionatization ot" the Army, generally 
understood as the consolidation of a notional, unifled corps, 
submitted to the discipline of t.he bureaucratic-admínistretive .,ap, 
para.tus, M organization which would oot disintegrate when faced 
with an acule momen , of the clMs struggle . The national S1atc 
clearly m&n.ifested lhe institutionalizat,on (ideological-pol itical 
and miUtary) of the domination óf the bou r¡;eoisie obtaincd 
under Calle.s ("). The birth of lhe Confederación de Trabajado-
res Mex.ic~nos (CTM) and of the Confederación Nacional Cam-
pesina (CNC) made it e~sy far Cárdenas to perfect the mt<:ba-
nisms of mediatioo such as the bureaucratic-administrative ap· 
paratus (as well as LO fomeot the capitalist economic develop-
ment) and gave way to the phenomenon of de.spotic presldcntia-
lism and to an authoritarian regime of only one política ! party. 
With the strengthening of these mechanisms, tbe Army was able 
to be reduced to a sec:ondary role ln nauonal politics , not becausc 
its incresed profess1onalization had • depolitíc1ud • h ns some 
authors sustain ("); but becáusc thc civil branch of the politk:a.l 
bureaucracy had adquired o clear predominance over its milita· 
ry counterp~ in the direction of the State. 
Cárdenas continue-0 with rbe p1·r,,oess of Míhtary professio-
nalizarlon, as wcll as witlt a spec.ific pr•ctice which had becn 
quite effectivc in rimes of Calles: that of promoting young pro-
fe.ssional officials to positions of strategic comman d. Calles had 
used lhese to e.reate a buffer zone hetwcen the troops and those 
gen~rals of dubious loyalty to the govcrnme nt; Cárdenas did 
likewise but now the young officials were imbued with a pro-
found oarionalistic sentimcnt due to events such es thc Expropria· 
non of the Petroleum lndustry and as a reaction to contlnuous 
¡,~ures coming from the United States . In 1938 the PNR was 
substit uted by tlle Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), 
made up of the followmg scctors : worker, peasant, popular and 
(IJ) Roaer D.artra, • La. Revolución Do1nesticada. del Bonapartismo P14u,e,. 
llób~ a l• Inatituclocaliia .ción de I• l3u..rtucsfa •. in RUto,ia y Soci,dad, 
Second Epoch. No. 6, Verano 1.975. 
(14) 1..ieuw(':l], • Mexican Millt&nsm •. llondfeld1 and Lo.1.oya. ()p . Cit. 
1(1.0 
mfü1ary. This change dividod op1ruo11s in the milita11· corp, 
but wn.,; obeyed by Gen. Avila Crunacho, Sccrctary of Defeuse; 
Cardenas's decision re!.ponded to rus recognition uf the direc1 
polivioal (Lhough secondary) role still played by tbe Army ("'). 
La.ter, as pr<'lSidenrial caodidate, Avila Camacho Jet it be lu,own 
that he was in complete disagroemen, wiih the ofli c1al miliuuy 
partñ,san acliÍvity ("). He was oonsidere.d 10 be a mediatiog element 
ín the turbulent electoral arena, as he recogniz.ed his devou1 
cathoHcism. 10 be neither fricnd nor enemy of índustrialists 
or workers, etc. ; e\fen iaside the Anny ( in conlrast to the oppo,. 
si üon candi date Gen. Almazán ) he was con~idered the only can 
d.idale oí na.tional unification, in spite of having • wou his gene--
re.l's stars b~hind 3 desk and not on ,he l.,attJefield •, a oorn· 
mon sayin¡¡ of Lhe e¡,och But this was precisely his special 
quality, he per&e>nified the military burenucrat, conscious of the 
grave ris ks invo)ved in any partisan participation of Lhe men 
in uniform; it would be • 10 return to Lhe p!IOt • as he bluntly 
expressed. 
The State could pcrmit divisions inside ,he official worker 
and peasllnl movernent , the malleable and rr.cept1ve part of its 
heart, but no, within its iron core. In the first month of his 
administratiori , ( 194146) Avila Camacho ordered the sold,crs ' 
im.mcdiaie withdrawGJ from the PRM. Once agaitt as before, this 
presiden, dirccted his messagcs to gencrals and high kvel mm-
1ary brass, in contras, 10 Cárdtnas who had dJrected thcm to 
lhe middle level ofticials and tht troops . Ali articles .. eferring 
to the development oí a socialist educa1ion • d.isa¡,peared • ere. 
ln this period a , rectification • was iniriated both in the civil 
sodety aod in the Army, the most reprc.sentalive •cctor o( the 
política! society; it had to be « depoliticized • by taking it out oí 
direct electora l participation: « in 01·der 10 avoid elections in 
the barracks, whicb could cause serious divisions • as Avila 
Camacho himself undcrlined . 
During Alemán's ~dministrution (1947-52) no significan! 
changes occ:urred withjn lhe Army, at the technical-organization· 
(J.5) FJ . A¡uilar Oot-~r.a , • E! PaJ)t'J de los MJUtattS en IR Etap• Carde. 
~ítta •, fcsts, Facuhlld de Cieno.as Políticas y Socl.a)I:$. IJNAM 1973, p, 81. 
(16) Lo"°yu, Op. Cfl., p, 101, 
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al or Jogístic level Tlte scarce eqwpment adquired during the 
Socond World War (") (clistributed only to e-lile u1rits of the 
c:,pital) provided the only news oí any worth . A considerab le 
group of young oHicials wa$ sen t to receive training in the United 
Stat.es. Upon rJ,eir retum, lhey we,e to occupy key posltions in 
the Departmenl of Dcfcnse : Secre taría de la Defema Nacional 
(SDN), replacing many officia ls appointcd dnring lhe cardenis t 
era because lhese last had rcached tl,e 3gc of retiremcnt or 
becanse of simple bureauc ratic cbanges of duty Alemán, fir.st 
president witb no milítary ba-:kground, designmed sorne of the 
new arrivals to high positions, such os Gen. Herme negiJdo 
Cuenca D1a2 as Under,Secretary of Oefense (''). 1'his renovatíon 
of command represe nted the most ,mportant change in the mi-
1.iuay st ruclure after 1920 ("). Those professional soldiers educ-
ated during the past lhree dr.cade• oí oonstant professionalization 
began to arrive to high and intermedia te command positions. 
Thcy were imbucd with the nationalism nf thc dcmocrat.ic,bour · 
geois Mexican Revolution , but lhey bnd also rc.ceived tra iuing 
fron1 arid maintained contact with nol"th amerjcan imperjaJ1sm. 
ln sp itr. of lhe i.bove ment ioned rotalion of duty. it is neces·· 
sa,·y to unde din e tha L thc process uf professio nalimtion which 
had l,~n ¡,ursued From 1920 to 1%8 bad been carrieú out prin· 
cipa lly al thc bureaucratic-o rganizatlonal and ideological Jevel 
and only par tialJy • L the logistic leve!. As a resuh, a parrial gap 
developed between lbc two levels wíth the first, ( tba t is, the 
suppréssion of persona l loyalties lo r.audillos and genera ls for 
olhers of an mstít ution al charnctcr: loyal1y to the president, the 
Constilution, etc .) receiving primary importance. Large adqw· 
sitions of modem armament and tecbniral equipment did noL 
COITC$J>Olld to modem melhods of organization aud dJscipline. 
()7) In 1942 Atexlcn accoptt:d a North Amuican loan 10 h"! uscd u, inodem· 
il.ina tM Army, Soe: Ahuja Ruiz. E. V1ctor y !\tfehel, M:.1roo Antool() • AUa.iua 
de cl . .uee y dominación: Mé-..ico 1930-1946•, lo /li.ttoria y St.,c,'Uad, No, 9. 197.6, 
A minute iw nmn.ry (lf thc Me:dcan Atmr.d Force•' capacitiC$ (roen atad á.T.nt.Á· 
ment, etc.) and dd'idet1ele$ in 1940 oomc in! Pl'l'!Wett, V{f"&ini.a, ..-Thc t.1cxk'an 
Atmy •, in forcip Afftúrs, Vol XlX.. No . 3, Apn1 1.9,41, 
(!&) !º,..¿ Luit. Piñeyro, • La suce3l6a p~.sidencJAt de l.9Sl: el Henriqut.'imo, 
el BJir'tJlo r los Campr-sinos •, ln$dh.it1> de JnvcsdJlaclo.M.'i SociaJ~s. UNA~\, 
mltneo&Nph. 1976, p. 40 
(19) 1.<iioya, Op. Cit ., p. tn. 
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... lt is nol lrur. tJtat the A,my, a,:corJing to /he. 
Co,ntitut{nns, should ,,avf. 110 polr'tícal participat,on; 
nu thc Mn.t rary, rhD funclion of tlte Anuy i.s prt!c.isel)' 
ro de/cnd th~ Cv,utrtut W". whiclr is thc legill fo,m 
of rht St.:tl~. ""'ith aU of ih· relared a,isrtrurlons. 
A. GRA~1SCJ 
B. · The Last '/'e.st 
The fuiure character istics o( thr. solclicrs' poli ticnl part id -
palíon (and of lhat o( lhe Army as an institution) and of U.S. 
militnry aid were clear ly defined during the prcsidentia l cam-
paign to elect Ale1nJn',1ii ~ucccijsor. The main contenders were. 
Ruh Corcinos, candidate o( thc Revoluc.ionnry lnstitutional Par-
ty (PRJ, founded in 1952, in substitution of ;he l'RM) and Gen. 
Henriquez G!úm án, whose condidacy was suppor tl.'<'i by the Fe. 
dcrorion of Parties of lhe Mexican People (FPPMl. The latter 
was a very prcstigious member of the national militia: he had 
been an intima te colaborator of C.!.rdenas (having been commis-
sioned tO put down the milit.ary rehellion of Cedillo in 1938 
and the upris ing o( Almazan's followers in IQ40) and by 1952 
bad also becomc a very wealthy businessman. Once again, just 
as hnd happened during iJ1e electo ral contest between Almazáo 
and Avila, Camacho, th ~ par1icipa 1ion of distingufahed generals 
prod11ced partisan factions withln th,• Armed ln stitu1e, sorne 
pro~Henríque:z, ot hers pro-Ruiz Corlint's.. But thc lnstitute as 
an inslHu t!on remained unified. 
On rcpeated occas,ons the SON mnnifosl.ed lis supposed 
• apoli tica l • attirude . with rnspect to tbc e lectoral debate as 
weJJ as thst of the Army as an organiz.ation. Alemán 's govern, 
mont reirerated tha t iL looked with favor on rhe free democrat ic 
cont~st. Gen. Sánche, Taboada , pre$ident of the PRI, was in 
complete agreemcnt with the federal exe<.'Utlve. Eve n 1hnugh by 
1952 thc rela tive lrnponance of the Army in comparison to ,hat 
uf lhe ideological-political npparatus had greaiJy diminished, 
certain key meo in uniform played • dedsivc role in the clection 
of Rutt Cortines. Ali of lhem wcre adequately compensated ("'). 
(10) Tbc PrC$)dcnt or the PRJ and Jeader of Na.dona! Con¡ ~s.. Col. Carlos 
St:rrwao, the: hcad oí the PRJ 1n tJtc capital, Gen. Alforuo C(norn- drJ Ros,1 
and oí course Cen, GiJbcrlo Lb:nón, s«:re tary of Odensc. S.\nchez T•boe.@. 
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In spi te of so many democratic promise.s, che Anny had an 
lndispenslble parl in the presidcntia 1 successíon, especially in 
the rural areas: patrolling, thrcatening, evcn physieally repres-
siJ1g peasants ,u the leas , i<xcuse. At 1he beginning, the PRJ-
Govemment tried to combat the fullowers of Hemiquei (henri· 
quis tas ) with pure violence . However, tbese -..,jolcnt method~ 
only raused an increase in the unpopularity of Alemán's already 
discredited regime . whích had been charac t~rized by a brul.31 
police-miliiary treatment oí the independent worker-peasant 
movements. TJ,e PRJ was forced to cnter the polilical battle on 
the ideological leve!, which is e.<aclly where the henriquistas 
wantcd it. Nevertheless. the PRT continued to adminisler r,on· 
siderablc doses of provocation (which eaused many bloody con-
frontations) combined with the creation nf a spcctacular propn· 
ganda apporat us (hcaded by Gen Corona del Rosal) which had 
1he job of glorifying the • revolutionary • virtues of Ruii Cor-
tim,s and <,f discredtitiog Gen. Henriquei Guzmán . 
Jt is ompossihle to evaluate tbe real suppot1 which the FPPM 
enjoyad within thc Army or the civil sooiety. But there is no 
doubt that the PRJ -Government was a ble to reduce the henri-
quistas ' possibility of recurdng to the living symbols of rhe 
Mexican Revnlution. Alemán dusted oíf a presidential decree 
of 1949 and in 1951 ordered tbe crealion of the Legión of Honor , 
o~n to ali Revohnionary veterans, and the coocession by tbe 
SDN oí medals • for Revolutionary meri 1 •- In a camavo l-llke, 
1hough depressing spectaclc, this organization brought together 
conquernn and the conquered: followers of Madero , of Carrao-
w .. of Villa, of Zap,tta, and of Obregón, but • ali tuúted •. The 
popular masses (cspecially peasants) consi dered GeJ1. Henrfquei 
to be the succcssor of Cárdenas because of his na1ionalist and 
agrariao sen-t.iments But whs-t bene,· proof could thcre be that 
Lhe III true revolutiona.ry • was Ruiz Cortines , than tl1at all vete-
raos of thc Revolution aod the grea t ma,iorily of the Constitu-
tionalisls gave hlm t.helr unconditional support? Anyway, 1he 
PRJ-Govemment dosed r:mks: it threatened bureaucrats and 
Pm,;i.dr.nt of lm 'PJU u.ndr-r Alemán, bea.me Secr-et'a1y of ihe Navy unde.r Ruit 
Cortlor.s; Coron& del RoSl.l wa.s madt aovemor or HjJ.ul¡o And Gen,. Jadnt o 
'Trcviño and Rafael Mel1ar, lca.c;len of pro,.R,uii Cortint3 ora:a.nilations weTC 
dccteJ senatllrs during h1s admjnis1ration. Piftqro , Op. c:it., p. 12}. ' 
l:li 
teachers in ordei to • convioce • Lhcm to regi~ter as vote.rs in 
the coming election; 1.he SDN conoeded two free aftcrnoons 10 
its personnel so that everyone, from the lowest soldier to tbc 
ruost important general could c<unply with thís • patriotic. duty • 
as Gen. Cuenca Dfaz. Under-Secre1ary of l)ef'ense, put it. Thel'e 
was an obvious effo,~ at coordin at.ion betwct,o thc PRI-Oovern-
ment and the SDN, whic:h. with specific rcspect to 1he latter, is 
underlioed in the following p:,ssage taken from an EditorioJ of 
the • Revista deJ Ejército• ('') publish<xl a month p.-ior to ,he 
election: 
We have to remember that • strcngth comes f, om 
unity • Bnd therefore we must be on the alert againSL any 
type of di$sassociation which could place our national 
íntcgrity in danger. We cannot pe.rmit any false hallucin-
ations... The formula of our de~tiny is synlh~.sized in 
these fow words: Work and Loyalty to Mexico through 
her ,nstitutions. 
The Sta1c's bureaucralic-administrauvc, ,doological-political 
and rcpressive npparntuses acted as one against the Jargest par· 
ticipat,ng op)X>sition party. 
On several occa,ions the SON rcite nned the Anny's unity 
anod • neutra•! • poli-i.ical character . Nevertheless , dunng the five 
months pnor 10 1he eleclion tlús Ministry took numerous prc,-
venllive ("') measures to áiscourage any oction by those who 
might be • hallucinating • ("); the result was that on e!eellioo 
day therc did not e~ist :u,y follower of Henrique,. (general or 
official) with troops under his command. Thc SDN took dif. 
forent hostile measure .s agaiust those me.o In iioiform wbo decl · 
ded to ope.nly suppor1 the FPPM, for example , giving them an 
unllmited leave of absense 10 participate in politic, instead of 
a limlltd onc, which wns rbc equJvalent of a discharge from 
active service. On the othc1· hand. the SON conceded promo-
tions and medals (sorne of which were conferred directly by 
(lJ) &vúta del EJl1cl10, AJ)tlWune, J9Sl. p. 4, Sditorhll : , La JcaJtad • 
nuestnas inititudone$ ~. italics addcd. 
(22) 0eml)tion or high aud Jn(.t.rmedi.atc commandus , concenuatlon of 
tJ'OOJ)1i in oertai:n clr.les and in the capital , ettation ot tbc Tenlb MiUt:ary 
Re¡ioo, cte . Pifleyro, Op, Cit., p. 170, 
(~) As M)fflC o[[-kers, follower5 of Almad.o. who had tried to take the clty 
o{ Monte.rn:y in 1940, after the cloe,oraJ det'eat. 
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Alemán) to a reduced group of officcrs. In addition 10 the pe1·· 
sonal a\Vards, there ,verc oú1ers of a general nature: hous1og, 
salary increase, etc. 
Hcnriquis1no's lmportance as a rnass movernent Ctl.n be 11Jr 
preciatcd in parl by the number of vote~ official/y recognized 
after thc election: 579,743 (-') (Ruii Cortine$: 2,713.4.19): which 
is a l.irge <[U3ntity if we tal<e into co;slde,alion that Geo. Alma-
,.án, .In 1940, was only ottributed a littl e mon; ,hao 150,000 votes. 
Ho,vever. many he.nriquistas considered this official to.tal to he, 
false; sorne estimated tha.t the real number of votes was greatly . 
super ior; others even went so far as to affirm that tbey had 
won the elect ion ("). Henr iquismo did not represent, as ooe 
resea,clier has stated (") . the last organized dis5idence in Me· 
xico, but rather thc last one to be permitted, ac tually semi· 
permiued . From this poim on, the PRI-Government would not 
pul up with any such dispute, withir, the • Revolutionary Fami-
Jy • or bourgeoisie, of whic h Henrtq uez was an outstanding 
member ("). Any il1usion about th,s decision \vtl$ eLiminated by 
the s laugbter of henriqui~tas who had assemblt.d in the capltal's 
Alameda (central par k) ro bold a vktory celebration: no one 
would be permitted to ques1ion the « ex.act and 1mpartial • e.lec:. 
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,/14) Tbc l.a.r1est riuantlty of \'Olefi attril>uted tó an opr,.o.,;1tk~ pany s:Lnce 
(25) ~UULJ.nts from VC1)' difrcrt-n1 politk.al oraa.niutions a¡itt that 1..he 
real number of w:ue, was mu..:.h great.er t.JJan that recoanltcd by lhe. aovc:ro, 
mcnt. lnte.rvlcw by Joi~ Lui.s Piñeyro to Lh::. Salv:.\dor Me.od.or..11, ben.riquisut 
lc3der, 14-VJIJ,76, J). 13, !bid . to Valentfn Campa, leade.r or tbe Mcx.lcan Com-
munls1 Pany. JO.X·76, p . 16. 
{26) Oclllvió Rodrfguei Antujo, " t::J Henriqu..í.tmo: úJti.ma d.isldcnc:u1 poli· 
tlca 01·,~uu:nda en Aiéxko • en Esrudíns Políticos, Vol. 1, Sep.,Doc. 1975, No. 3-4. 
Pellku pzirtially ¡¡ree,s wilh lb.is autbor, but oft'crs • more &0Jid aud criticaJ 
tU'lal_vsls: Oiga Pclllcer de 13rody, ce -el dta1noronam.icnto de la oPOSicl6n: el 
ca.tio del HcnriQuis.rno "• 1o Flistoria de lil Rn,o!ucidn ltftxiClAJta'i perll>do /9j-z. 
1960. Vol. VfU , No. 13, El Cote¡.io de México, Aile.'<ico, O.P. 1978, 
(17J Rerul(Ju~z. Gu>'tllán .ccepted t.h.e offidal t'tl'dict cven thou.1h the muses 
reltclr.d JI, beca.use the Trt"uury Ocpartmmt had plac:ed a fl$Cl.l amb....-10 on 
hh businesscs because of a rtal or $Upposod con~payment of 25 mllUon peAO~ 
l.n tues. For Ht"nriquei , h w¡¡¡ obvk>ui;Jy more r.o.mfortable to to~ t tbc 
politica1 .idveotu.re and conteJ'\-oe hi.s bu.sinC$s.t'$. The PRI opmed ILS doora to 
ad.mil or l"e3dmlt aJJ • disorlent«d • rC\-olutiuoarie1; thoS<' hi!!llrlqulrt•s wbo 
did not ar«.pr \11'C!re o:;tra.cb:eJ or tragk,ally .tlmin.atcd . h was Rui.t Col'dnes • 
J'IC\ ... policy, vr.ry diíí~t form that of bis íttodou!" predecc.s.sor . Gen. Ga.rcla 
&..rrarin, prominexn member or JaJeorlqua·, .nillha.ry support.ers, Later Sec..n-
ta.ry of Drft"JlSe' (196S.J970) v.•1.s an cxcc:JltDI cxample of 1hjs polf.cy. 
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to1'al results. The Political lnst ituce reprcsenteted by the PRI 
would allow no comroversies externa! to itse l( , and even less 
within the Arm~d lnslitutc and its prominent members. After 
this last 1est, the rnen in unifom1 had le.arned tl,e lesson; from 
tbat Lime on, no grou p has evr,· sough 1 to fulflll it,; political 
nmbitions outside u,e PRI. W1th tune n hase>n group or elite 
wbich serves as a substitute for the military sector eliminatcd 
from the PRM was croared. Gen. Corona del Rosal (") togcther 
with o tl1er high level officicrs, wou ld head this group wiWn the 
PRI for a long time . Tlus group has become the channe l through 
wbich highranklog rnilltary rnen can voice the ir personal or 
group demands, or tbose for the Army as on institution; or they 
sAtisfy tbem as representa tives or senators by formally present · 
iJ1g their reguests lo the NntionoJ Congress, bul in reality these 
demands are sntisficd by dlrect intervention of the President 
of the Repub lic, Commande r in Chi<f of lhe Armed Forces. Mem-
bers of the liason group commonly follow chis trajectory : re· 
present~tive-senator,governor and sometimes Secretary of De. 
fense ('-"). 
After 1952, tbis elite , formed by young officers aJJd gene-
rals, not onJy reaftilmed ns presence but 1-emained permanent-
ly conslltuted as t.he on ly channel or communicatiou betwr,en the 
Army and the bureaucratic-polític~J apparatus . cspec,nlly the 
PRJ. This has given rise to a doubly antidc mocratic situa tion: 
ioldiers cannot persona lly participate in opposition political 
pa1 ties nor c.an they elect the liason group's members . The 
whole mexican púlibcal system's antidemocracy had found eco 
with!n the natiortal militia. 
Tbe otbe.r lesson learned from the experiencc of 1952 bad 
1.0 do with U.S. military assistancc . In 1951 thc U.S. Mutual 
(23) Backaround: reprcscntative of rhe PRM'$ mihtor,.· sector, cona-reJ. 
sjona 1 ~prnert.tadve (19-10-43}, 5('.natt>r (1946·.sl), aovt-mor oE 1.lu: St..ltt: of Hiclala:o 
(1953--59), Prc,~n, or tbe PRJ ( 1958-64), St-.ere:rary of Natur~ Jte.sourtes (Pitrl· 
,nonio Nacional ) (196«'6) ~tayor of the ca))ltJI (196(,.70), (m cnlianed .t.s a p0$ · 
síble presldentlaJ candidate in 1970) ilDd tn 1973 re1utned te, thc PRl's NationaJ 
Comml11oe. 
(29) Octav(o Rodtf1uez Araujo, • C4taloao d-t St'nadores y Diputados: J!M0-
;1. en Op. Cit. Estudio6 PoUrkos. 11. is ncotsnry t0 cl.arl(y thnt lo ~hts CA.la• 
loaue , ¡orne miU!ary mcn dll not appcar a, sur.h, for eoxampl~: Gen . Jo1o~ Orú:it 
Avila, rx.aovcrnor or lhc state ot Carpp«he . 
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Security Act stated 1hat any countiy which wanted 10 receive 
military donatioo,; had to sign a bilateral 1reaty comprom i"Sing 
itsdf to participate in tmssions to • defrnd the western hemi-
spl:te.re •, ,ha1 is. it was obliged to send troops to a foreign count· 
ry in oase oE miliuuy conflic.~ in any part of the « free western 
world •· The ,alks between ,h~ north amencan and meit.ican 
commi~sions contZrning this agrecment lasted two ,veeks in 
rnmplete secrecy. During, this 1iroe, the F"PPM autl Jeftist partics 
(Commuuist Party, Popular Part y aod Worker-Peasant Party) 
pul on an importa 111 r.ampa1gn of ~gitation agains t any military 
agreement with rhe American Umoo. Finally, Alemán made pu· 
b!Jc ,he decision 10 rcject nny conditioned assistance, that is , 
not to accepL "'ar cquipmeJ',t and tech nicol n1aterial in donation 
in the proposcd terms , terms which we,·e ,cceptcd by rnany latln 
america n nations . lo this way the limils oí any [uture milit;,ry 
aid werc establishcd : adquisitíons would co nsist of ¡,urchases 
pa.id for ln casb or by n1eans of Pentagon loans solicited by 
the Mexican Stat e; the sanie thiog woutd hold true for 
training (,.)_ 
The donatinn was only one aspe.el or the pc,stwar imperia· 
listic rrulitary s trategy. This pomt of dilfcrence did qot signify 
a funda mental contradíclion with imperiofüm; it was bctter 
(JO) The taclt aJl'ttm-c:nt was vcry c:htiitir: Nllrth i\merir.an Tililitary pro. 
v1s1ons wouhl •lv.•.,.,ys be snHa.blc., wbcn lhe most biHtr mc,mcnt$ of the clll.SS 
struga:le wouk:I rt':t:¡UÍ.C th.e A.nny's mode•rnlr.s.tion. tl:ut u. lts proressionaUui1i0n. 
This had becn prcvlou$h' proveo by lhc t:rL~:. provoked by mllltary rebellious 
in 192_. in d l!ll9. Durina thr- firsr. :d'te• tlic J,.te~an ¡9vernmcn1 had acceptod 
tl1e sha.mcfw and anduat,onal Euca1"e111 Tre.11úcs, thc: North Ametican eovern • 
1neu1 J-acllitotcd ~ crodll purchaie 1>t 17 Jlrpliwti (plloteel by amt!Tioan•>. lSp:!O 
riftt.s and S millton curtrfd.cr,s, and nor1h a.merica.o pet.r0Jc.um compan tes grant· 
cd a. LO m1llion (lolla.r IOtf'TC!>t·ft~e lDan~ Thli. <1id e.am e ln \!et)' handy in puttin¡ 
do,vn abe Or.J:i.hueru uprimu.¡ . A new tupply or Msiuance helpe d defcat l!SC()-
b$1f1j¡ ..:oup (1919.1: t0,000 rifles. 10 million cand(l¡es and so·me. aU1)1ancs p1loted 
bv au1crica.ns. Se<>: Jcan (l;\c,tl '. J,.o Rt w¡lnc.tdn Aftiil-'2ttO: l'.110·19"&0. Ed. Oopesa. 
~lona. 1973, p. l 17 y 115, From 1~29 lo 1.9SJ the rrttt~t pa1 l of the Army 
wa,; equiped wilh old rnausers (and cve:, unnJ 1%1. !.eC pp. U9,J3S of thls Arttcle) 
manufaeturcd l>v the J\1ilibU'Y Tudui;try DcparuucrJl whic.h abo producrd thc 
• Vargas• ¡ubmaehin~riun. the • }.tcndó:r. • rifle mschlne-run, and Lltt. • Obrc-
¡on • ph,101 íoT 1he elite co1p&, thar wtre also tu1nisbed wllh rrtod~rn a.rm•· 
mecl imfl()rl.ld tr0m North Amt:rlca . Stt: Rt11ürt1 del l;Jircit,;,, Oct.·Oh:, 1952, 
p. 141 and El Lcaioriorin: <lrc:tno dt ia .Legtdn df' Honor ltf~:x.i.con,, No,•. 1952, 
p . 59,62. 
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to !et the • cierna! • Mexican Revolu1.ion follow its cou_rse. On 
1.he other hand, by that ume the United Statcs had already esta-
1.,lished offic1al cootacr wllh ou r Arme<l Forces by mea os of 
the mexican delegat ion in th~ Interamcrican Defense Council 
:md the Me<ic-nn-United States Muta! Defensc Commission (>'). 
C. · The Dertatioria/ized War.-ior? 
Neverthdcss . to co11sider the mililary dcpenden ce on im-
períalism as the prim~ry elen1ent in accounting for changes 
whicb have occurred ,vithin the Merican A1my is not very use-
ful, nor, as oM sludenl or the mauer ~ustJins (''). does it help 
in understanding a greater political partícipation by our rnen in 
uniform or an e-ventual coup d'etaL Hov..,e\ler, thel'e are other 
more queMionable versions produeed by certam dépendent isls 
who go 10 the extreme of ,peaking <lf thc « denationalization of !he 
(3l) Ncl.ther did ,ve s:lgn Ll'~·.'ll1C~ whích woulc1 have l)l!'frnitted the in· 
staUaüon or mjli1ary. navaJ or a.ir b11sci, within tl1oe countf)' , ln c1>nlr~1 to 
tJ.1,c re,t oí our slster na.don.$, buL objectlvely ?.pt.alung, w<: sre ,·tnu.aJly 
su1rounded by nor-th amcri un militiU'Y rtStabll,hnlCnts: .:s.H alon& our northern 
barder , Sn 1he. Caribbc:.1n, and In lhe 1outt, by ,he Pnt'lami Canal 'tbr Mex.ican 
$tate did not awcpl avr«:mcn.fj which would tu,v~ counteua nced 1he cstabhsh· 
rnent r>f US m1lituy or poli...e mis~i()fl$, buL the FRI .t.nd the ClA ha\'C acred 
openty Reieent.\)' the dcn,ocrati c an ti revuJu11onary press ha\ denounced thc 
:tetuati on or these &PY age ncie¡. Sr.e: ' E.1,tll.stor: 6-XI(,77, and Uno md.l Uuo: 
1·3/XI/78 and Qp01/c;Jn . # 203, 122 and !59 of 24-IX· n. 1-n,.11.18 a.nd 13 XI-7i. For 
infonnation 11bout ¡,ast ClA acth•itl<"S. Scc PhUllp A¡ee. CIA. IJ,ary: '"sid~ 1h, 
Ct>1nV4,nY, Pen¡uin Books , Grcal Brlta1n, 19"15. 811cJground data on 1he flrescnl 
CIA comes In: L.ury HtlJ, /Zmirsari~J ro a Re,..oiutton : WoodTOI\I WJ.IJOn's 
~,:utive a,tt!t.$ 1r1 J.§,.x,co, Lou81a.n• St.ate Unlvetsity Pu~S'l. 1973. \Vt mentinn 
lhe abo,•r. i.nformatlf,n wilh th e inte.ntion of puntLuab.tin.a th11t, U h 1s rr\le 
Lbar Mexlco is form.Uy a • uniq uc case• in U11n America ,'11\h respOCt to 
impe:rialmrt'1 ¡lobal millc.aey !ilra\e&Y, In reallt)' p:irtial ur total sub!Jtitulf"..S do 
e~SI lQ covt.r l.hc absen~ of bi~. m1s~iof'I}, ele . AU of whích ,nusl be co.nsid· 
en:d In order to eva lu&tc. t.hc re,I weiíht of US miJitary prc.w.nce now t>T In 
a futu.re enJel'¡tJ'lcy sicuadon. 
(32) &ils , Op . Cit •• p . 1.67. By ptraph1,1tt1ng Bo'lrtro whcn he !lptakl uf 
ccr.>nomtc: dcpendt-.nce (Op. CH., Historia y Sociedad No. S) wi: can say that 
mHl,uy de;,t..ndcnoc csse.olially e-xplaln-5 tbe followin.ii: characte:rl-.tic.s of 1he 
aoeumulation ot hi¡:h Lec-hnolosr;y miUtary eq,u1pmcn1; ¡enua1 and spcc.:laJized 
tra.inina in anthobvcrslvc 'l\CtivitJes: a gap whicb may o«:u:f bctwcen thc a,owth 
and organiz.ation of the ;\nned Forces: provoL.ed by modtrll Q1'1aniz11lion mc-
lhod, ónd Lhc- spcclfK 1um.-. of an • une"¡uat ex..:hanae • bctwet n nation.a.1 
mi.licias. Wbat 'We ha"Yc juu stat~ ir. intendett (lnly as • dCSCriJ)nvc notion 
(and no, as a e,,1;1e¡ory) whkh 5p,oefticr. tht torm (In this c&se, mUitary detierl· 




Arrned Forcos • ("'). Ch~ng.,, jn malüary proíessiona'iization 
(ncw armumenc, tact1c,, orga ni 1.&Lion. etc .) bave a]ways been a 
diroc1 or indirect resulL of the class struggle ancl not of the 
ideological·logistical dependence on Nor th A.me,;ca. 
The SON did not receive any TJS donalions 1vor1h mention-
ing during 1he admirnstra tion of Ruiz Corttnes (1953-58) b11 il 
did vaum a new generat ,on of officíals and generals During 
the milita,-y parades which werc a tradilional part óf certain 
na1ionnl holidays, it was very common to sce soldiers marchíng 
in perfecl íorma1ion, wearing faJed unifonns and carrying guns 
of World War One vintnge. This sr.ene re ¡,eated itself Jn the 
capital, with the exception of the elite corps . well armed and 
we!I prud. The followmg deocrip tfon is perfeet (''): 
A general idea of the epoch was based on an image of 
the Army as a smo.11 and ra<her lau¡;hable organíutiou 
of dusty and ignorant generals. who retumcd home every 
afternoon 011 a public bus after having nursed theír 
hemoroids while sitti ng. behind grey desks in the Dtpart-
ment of De[ense , and of illiteratc soldiers, badly paid 
and only armed with old carb ines and 7mm. rilles. Even 
though this was a caricature, il did par1ially rescmblc 
the truth . 
Allhough it may secm cc,ntradictory, by this time the Army 
fulfillcd almos t •11 1he basic rcqu ircmcnts of rm,dern profcs-
siona lizatfon ("): 
a) members of the military corp are fullüme cmployees 
b) a ccrtafo degree of btu;,aucra 1ization e) an au lono-
mous set of norrru which rule ,he organiution d) per · 
manen! provis ions in the natio na l bu dget e) e.sprit de 
corps f) technical specializat ion g) corpora1iven css h) 
professional rcsponsa bility. 
----(.\'\) Sc:vt1~ of thc papen. tT.ad •• thc Conaress • L·~nr.n Ladno\ ¡atto 
l't.rt.mo11la milh~re • hcld in &>loan.a, ltaJy, April 1-3. im CAO be locluded 1n 
1his 1roup Fot examp lt:": Alain Jt>Jtt • Lo!. mHitatt't lltlnoamcricanoJ y la 
det.nac!ona1iuek'i.n de l E..slJ.do •. !he abovc mentioncd pa¡,crS ha-ve becn put,J. 
Uhed in: Chtlt·Attub·ico; reVUlta del CenLro de Elltur.Uos y Documen1:eión Chilt"· 
América, No. Jl..J,f, J'-uly,Augu$l 1977, and by rondaz..ioue lntcmazi<lnale Lrlio 
Bass.o, Rtprus.inrte e. J.filita.rismo n~ll'Attit.ric.t Lctiti.a, Newton Compton Edí· 
1o.rt Roma 1978. 
(34) Opolicrid"~ wcekly publlation of Lhce Centra) Cúulnlilltt ol thc Mcxican 
C.ommu.nist Part-Y, 7-114 76. O, 6. (l5) V ir¡iUa &, Itrio, El /"apeL Polltico d~ ltll Futrtas A:t~nadas ,;n Amtrit>« 
Ulrirta, ~tonte Avil,i, Caraea,, 1970, pp. 35·37. quotrd by BoUs. Op. Ch .. p. 100. 
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The only characterist ic which our militia dld not sati,f-y 
\\'llS that of h:1v1ng a d1stinctive social stalus. Thls apparenl 
¡,aradox was due to " lack of com,Spondence bctween tl,e burea u-
cratic -orgamzatio nal and ldeolog,cal l1>vel of profeuionafüa tion 
and the Jogislicnl one, whic h in turn is expla•ned by 1he fact 
that most of the di!fic11lt 1nomenu: of the dass struggle haJ been 
dominateJ by the effocuvenes~ of the Statc's ideological -politir.al 
apparatuses. Since the c.ontinuous ¡,resence of th~ Anny had 
nol been necessary, adquí$ilions of modern US armament and 
technical equipment had beén almost ni! (") In other words , 
,vithout trying I.O evaluate it in an automatic ma·nnr r: greater 
purc hases oí militá.ry eq,ú-pmem (with ali that this 1mplie&: new 
instolla lions, exercises , etc.) signif1es a greater politica1 prese.oc.e 
uf the Army (as an insti1ution and as a pressure group made up 
of the miHtary élite) ("); Jc,i.ds 10 thc possibilil y of obtainíng 
grc.,ter Cringe benefits, that in tum give 1hc Arn1y a supcrio, · 
status w.hkh deferentiates it from the population . that is, from 
the average living condilions oí urban worki ng classes, and puls 
it much a bove 1hose of the rural prolc tariat and of the poor 
peasant. 
Jl. ~ T he &tur n t.o A-1·ms. 
A . . The ca/1 to the Wttrrior 
Ouring Ruii Corunes' administra 1ion, the Army hardly ever 
Jeft its barracks, this u·anquil sítuation was interrupted in thc 
first years of Lopei Mateos' administr.ition ( 1959-64). Almos! 
immediate ly he was foced wiih a s1ep-up in the class struggle 
in wlúch all tlte State's mechanisms of mcdialion failed and 
only repression remaioed. a'e1weén 1958 and the end of 1961, 
(36) Th1s f.OU'CC quanflly oí modtrn equ..ipinent was dish Lbutod. amon:g t.he 
~lite w,its of 1he uphal· !hes.e units wcndd 10 to a.ny l't'gion whe.rf lh~ po1ite 
or rqula.r milit-ary troo;s eould not c:ant.aio thc popular dcmonst rationt. 
(J7) Thc • ~cc:ret • of this sea.roe q_u•ntily ot rnilíta.r,t adqubttlons can 
br. auribulled, to thc f..than<:teristks ot lhc d~s.s st.ruaglc: t.he form of confron-
t~lio.n (whr.ther Il etn t;e medi.11ted or not) i1s nature (armed or not) a.nd lts 
Jevet ocon,:,mic. ideolo¡ica.1 or volit ioal. lf lh~ ideoJoaical~IC1JisLlc~J dtpe n, 
deoot on Imptnali.s.m were- 1he e ke.y • to thit understanJ.inl of Latln A~oe.n 
miUu.nsm, lt .,..'OUJd be tufficicnt jusL to know it.l! particul.arhies and obJecuves . 
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the militia played a primary role in sutfocating the widc-spread 
strik<s o( railway workers (1958-59), of those of the employees 
oí t.he MClJcan Aviation Comp•ny, uf Lclcgrapb, telephonc and 
¡,ostal workers (1960); in 1961 iL dlssolved Lhe studcnt move-
mcnt <in Mexico City; in rural zones of Guerrero nnd 5an Luis 
Potosi, in Puebla ru,d Veracruz whcre íL r ut down an uprising 
headed by Gen. Celestino Gasea, etc. The nülitary reports were 
alanning (' 5). Givcn the abo\'e desc:ribed situation, il is not 
surprising LO know that bctween 1960 and 1962 the Defe1,sc 
DepartmenL bought 14,120 rifles and machine guns in the US 
(enough to reann 50% of the lnfant:y) and 3200 troop transport 
vehides (") . These orms were dJstribu ted in ,he accustomed 
manner: to the elite units in whom the politkal bureaucracy had 
rnore confidence ('") . 
When 1bis r,hase of active and decisive participation in thc 
• resolutJon • of rrruluple politieal coofl,cLs was over, rhe men 
in uniform had adqwred a cc rtain re l:,.tivc autonomy with 
respect to the civil branch of the SLate, in thc sense c,f being 
able to pre..o¡sure 1.0 obt~in grtaLer conoessions. During l .. ope1. 
Mateos· administration. there ,vas an enormous increase in fr1ngc 
benefits (reurement funds and íamily housing) (") especially 
after 1961, when Lhe Social S•curiLv Law of tbe Armed Forces 
was pro;,,ulgated. . 
tJB) Mld co, Sf,ere:tarfa de ta De.lN\U NaclonaJ, Men,o;UJ, Dic. J\,lfO.Nov 
!%1. MM!oo, O,F, Tliler Autognlfico del BJ~rclto, p. JO. 
(39) 10$6 Luis Ptftcyro, • El ...,.orcsinnaJ Ej~rcilo Mcxica.ru) y la Asi.t.tcnda 
Militar de f.:'.51ado$ Unido,: 19tiS.197S •, Thc,;.ir., ~l (.Qleglo de i\it!xh.'O, Mt:xic;O, 
D.F. 1916, •• · 73-19 
(40) Thlt permlttod the c.reation Qf II sys1em oí checks 3nd balao(.tes even 
lns-ide tht Army, bcl~.('D wcll·a.rmt".d a.nd rcmunerated troo_ps and re¡ulat 
trnops Ho~'tl'tl ' lhis S)l!itcm had pa.n.iidly disappea.rcd by thc midd.le 1960'.s 
,vhen it wa, nect:sury to rca.rm a grcater number oí troopli with -n1odrm 
,u·ma.me:ru duc 10 tht ou1breaks ot rural guc:rri)la and 10 the ons laught of 
worker a.od J')lf3.laDI tnde aniori insurg~nc}'. Jn 1961 tbcrt: wa.s an excJum¡e 
ot diok.lmatlc notes betwttn ~iexi:C'o and the! US whcrcby CM US wouJd supply 
Mexleo wJth 'l)olice e:quipmC'nt. and lbere wouJd be a mutunl cll.chauge ot oon 
rldcnlial lnformation. In t.he same yu.r haU a mUJion dallan: were grRnt<"d 
to cnabl.e. i1:eitlco to purch2w lbjs cqu1pmcnt. Ttutlts and Othe.r Jntr.rnationol 
A.trtt1t1mt s, Uohod St1.res IN-p,nmnit oí St.111e, Wa11hingtnn. o.e . lJnitcd 
Sta.tes Governme.nt Printing OJtlr.t", 1961-62, Janua..ry 1, 1~74, 9 172 aod Plñeyro, 
Op. Cit., • Et Prores.lona.1.-•, Table Vlll . 
(41) t.oioya, t)p. Cit., pp. 124-2;, 
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B . • The proftssionalis,n o( the Warrior incre.a.<t,f 
The years 1965 and 1966 are of primary importance in undtr · 
sLand;ng the quantit.ativc and qualitative modification s which 
have takoo place -..~tbin tite na1ional miliL,a (<Z). !n thé lirst 
year, the Army-Navy Joinc Manoeuvres ,vere initiated, \Yh.ile in 
the second, we hove tite beginning of the Army's Regional E>.er· 
cises (RE). Botb practice.s wen, impress ive beca use of the m<r 
bilization of thou .~ands of soldiers who engaged in practidng 
anti-guerrilla and antisubversive tac tics. Th~ probkms conironL· 
ed during tl,e RE varied according LO the • soc ial climate • and 
the terrain of each zone. Amoog the problems which had to be 
• solved • were : 1) civil disturbances and /or subversion . 2) ar· 
mee! llprising by ~mrul grnups 3) workcr and/or trade un ion 
conflicts 4) problems of an agrarian nai-ure, cte. The official 
RE t'eport of 1966 undcrline<I Lhrre aspecLS whicb required im· 
mcdiate attention: a) reorganization nnd preparatiun of thc Ru -
ral Defense Corps (RDC) for antiguerrilla warfarc b) a need 
for new armamen t, owing LO • 1.he absolute disadvantagc of the 
federa l troops which are mamly arrned with old rifles in com-
parison wilh rhc automaLic arms used by subversive elements 
and common ,,riminals • {"). e) a Lotal renovatio n of Lhe trnns-
missions syslem, essential for coniact between headquart~rs nnd 
field troops. ' 
The RDC's reorgani1.ation tr-ansfonncd them ü110 an ilnpor-
l-an l auxtliary body lor the Arrny in the cúun tryside , where tbcy 
&erve as « spics, guides, me:$St.nsers and jo the capture o[ cri· 
minal$ and drug traff!ckers •. They now form units (wh.ich 
ore well prt.p:ired) to comba! rural guerrillas and subversives 
and constilute a potcntial reserve nrmy, ,vhen ,ve C"onsider that, 
even after their reorganizauon, in 1970 the RDC's had 38,000 
members . Three other aspcc1s werc included in th" 1966 reorga-
nization: the rotation of commands, m order to givc al] the per-
~onnel an opportunit y to e.'<ercise command n.nd to reno vate 
ali levds of 1he chain of command, tbc massive elaborntion of 
(42) l n 1965 Lhc. VS sent a.nothtt· 1 245,000 dolllU'5 io Yofice Assi&tan~ \\•hlch 
has c<in!,tilutcd tha !.ccond t.nd Jast offlc:lal grant ol th.li type of a1d.. PUieyro, 
Op. DL, • El Jlrofcsional. .. •. Table Vll t. 
(43) }l$9ista del h'ftrriro, Dec. 1966, Op. Cit., p. 13. 
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manuals about « Irregular Warfare •. and last, but pcrhaps most 
transcendental 111 this proc.es.s of restructuration : the fact that 
89 officers went to be rrained in the United States. The follow· 
mg yea, two new ,chools were foundt:d 10 prepare officers ns 
spc.:-ialisls ln ~tí-guerrilla warfore: The Schoo l of Applied Tac-
tics iu Jnfantery, Artillery and Jntendency and that oí Applied 
Cavalry Tactícs. Tn North America the students learned the la test 
techmques of Irregular Warfore and antisubversivc tactics . The 
imporrance of US lraining does 1101 re.tuire addltional com· 
mcnts: from 1950 to 19o3, thcre ,vere a rotal of 2.40 officers 
who rccclved tralning; frum 1964 to 1968 the total was 3-06 ( .. ). 
Without going into detail about the multiple technical-or -
g:rni,ational advances which had ocr.urred, there is no doubt 
that by 1968 the Mexic;¡in Army was much be tter prepared to 
« maintai:n • interna! secunty. On the tragic 2 of October, faced 
,vith a mass1ve demonstra1ion by students and popular masses, 
the militia • had the opportuoity to put into practice whal 
it had learned about co nu·o.lling "Civ.il Di.sturbances and 
Riots" > {"). •nd, we might add, the elite corps had rhe chance 
LO use their recently adquircd modern equipm~nt. In spite of 
this laconic military language. the inte , nol repcrcussions after 
the massacre carne to the surface. 97 high and medium leve! 
commands ,vere súbstituted, in compa.rison with the annual 
average oí 10 to 15 $UCh changes ; five lnfa ntry Batallions had 
to undergo official inspr.c1.ions because of problcms pre.sented 
hy the troops ~ga:inst their cottlmonder s ("'}. On Oct . 2, the Army 
carrie.d OUL its order.s. but ü also revealed sorne ,veak points . 
AIJ Regional Tactical Exercises were suspeuded; the units were 
ordered to dedícate their energy to a « rev,sion of all trainlng, 
e5pecially that io which they had rece ntly proven to be defi-
cient • (''). The police also revealed oeru.in deficienc:lies, which 
were par!'l<\lly overcome with speciaJ U.S. tra;ning ("). Po'lioe 
(44) Pil\eyro, Op. Cit ., • El Profes1on11L.. », pp . 8&-93 and Table> XIV, XX. 
(45) Mcmorta, Sept. 1%3-AU&UtS 1969, Op. Cit., p. 4S. 
(<16) Some comm•nds \yhJch wcre substltut.M wcrc: tJ1e fint and scc»Jld in 
romn1.ind ol lhc Amn• Ge.ne.raJ Stafr. th~ St.crct:lfy of Oefcns,e',- prívate SCCN'-
tacy, l\C'Vco M111Lary Zone. Comma nderi , etc . !bid. )968, p . 100. 
(~n Ihid .. p. 3S. 
("8) Sttwcm 1969 and 1972, M po11cc oftir.ers ruelvrd t.cainin¡ 1n thc. U.S. 
and two more alleodt.d the • Bomb Sc:hool, [or polke: ttrroria&m, t«:att'd LO 
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force& operatc in u rban wnes, while thc Army patrols rural 
areas, but the latter al,o hclps 1he former whe11 the disturban ccs 
are beyond its cap aci(ie s. There is a delinile but ela5tic division 
of labor with respect to vigilance and coe-rcion 
Thc )asL ,,vo yeaTS of Diaz Ordaz' adn1inisLr3tion ,,1erc." of 
cardinal impor tance in lhe Jogis1ics aspc..:1. 'fht Army contlnued 
to buy au1oma1ic riíles ond mad1ine·guns, principally frorn Bcl-
gium. but also from the U.S. and Israel; in addition Mexiw ob· 
tained tbe patent to manufact.u,·e lhose arms c.oming Erom Bel-
gium. The repartition of this modern armament corresponded 
to th~t u~ed on 01htr occasions, it wcnt to the elite corps (Presi· 
dential Guard ) and to those whkh were ;,pecialized in antisuh· 
ver·sive tactics such as thc « ju ngle unit• •. By 1970, the 15,900 
new arms were sufficie.nl to cquip 50% of the Anny. During 
this same yenr , the Air for ce adqu ired 20 new U.S. planes for 
training and 17 more for transport ( .. ). As we can sM, 1he great 
bulk of this new equipment was acquired afrnr tl1e extensivc 
student·popu la r movement ar 1968. 
fil. · The Pwfossionalúed Gormo 01 • lho .New Milltary ~fon? 
A. · Tht Warrior in a dyna,r1ic social environment 
The popular struggles which 1;,egan with the rallroad wor· 
kers ' movement in 1958-59 and culminated ,vith the stude.nt· 
popular movernent of 1968 showcd tbeir profoundness and ma· 
turity ln tbe revindications they prodaimed and in their impact 
on the Armcd lustilute. « Thc leve!, c:Qlllent and procedure of 
th< class s truggle advanced more and more rapidly throughout 
Lo,¡ Prunos, Texa,;. Piñeyro. On. Cit., e El Prote,1onal..., Tablc!o V, VI and 
VJl, This conJtitut~ il very 1mpo1tant piecc of ln!ormRtion, .!.Íncit 1t happens 
aftc:r thto studczH•J)Opu)ar movt':ltlent oí 1968. thls is t.he fJJ"$t tilne thnt l.Ml't 
¡~ an ot(iri41 rtcoanltioo of poliu attcnda.nce at tht oourses offercd by lhc 
Public Securicy Olflet oí ch< AID. 
(49) Proan 1962 to 1fil70, the b,lk of the land era.o.sport n~1work w,-s cstab-
lls.bed with tbt purchasie, c.,f more lhan 2,500 01()10f vehicles, the m,:jority nr>rtl1 
61'.M'ritan, u wdl as wi1h lhat of 750 f10rtable ta.dio unit, and rnaterJ•J for 
thc Carto1,r11,pb)1 .DetiArtment. Piñeyro, Op. Cit., pp. 70-1l7. 
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the decade of the 1960's • (""). The cc1falnty of th,s observation 
with respect to Lópe, Mateos' and Díaz Ordaz' ndmini~trations 
is beyond question. Tbe ucban mssses' demands advanct.d from 
thosc of a merdy ecooonúc type Lo those ol a more arnple 
political nature. Inhuman livit,g condirions and the repressive 
r.reatmenL wh.ich any rural protesL demonstration reccived caus-
ro a clefinile chMgc in the class str~gglc, tuming ll!lto a.rrned 
movemcnL, in some of 1 hese a reas. Ge.ographically speaking, 
these ·werc well defincd: they coverecl p•rl of' lhc state of Guer-
rero and tl1is stDte's comn1on border \\dth More(os, Oaxac..1 and 
Puebla, as well as some isola1ed outbreaks in Chihuahua. The 
Mexican State always tried 10 underestimáte the popular sup-
port givM to these guerrillas . Jiowever, the Fact that it mok 
the Army sb< years (from 1968 when VflSque, RojM esc..aped 
from prisori to 1974 when Cabañas was killed) to suppn,ss the 
guerrillas and that there were IS,000 solrliers in Guerrero • com-
bating ag,.inst drug traf6c • should give ao idea of the real sup-
port on which the ,ebellíous peasants ~ould count . The urban 
political struggle maniíe,ted itself in different ways; here also 
appeared an urban guerrilla, which bascd its action on certafa 
runorphous socialist ideas bul which nevcr obtamed ,mportant 
mass backing. 
The ruling class's politicaJ represen tatives were very worri-
ed by this new dimension in the class sttuggle (both at its 
arme<l and unarmed leve!) ; this •ign,fied an open rejectton of 
the t.raditiooal instrurneo1s of domination: however, it was clear 
tbat this first aspee!, which the « democratic • treaunent an-
nounced by Echeverrla's government (1971-76) could nc,t allow, 
was that wbich required an immediate « remedy •. Because of 
this situation, lhe milita,·y bureaucracy participated in the rural 
areas, not only in a strictly military sense, but also with its 
Civic Action (CA) or Social Labor (SL) activities trying to filJ 
the void left by the civil stmctures of mediation . lo ord"r t.o 
(50) Se:rvio de ta Peña, • Un .s('x.enio d.e lucha Ctt cl.ues t".O Mtxico. 1g)'O-
l97b • . in Historin 1 S()cil:44d, Second Epoc:b, Nó 10, 1.976, p. 41. Ru.raJ ateaS 
a~ patroUod Cli'lusively by thc Anny. Thc dl'JCpm.ing erosiou of rural $lrucLW"tl 
of med1ati0n provoke its more .trOQueot Md violent 1ntervenuon . For an e,;• 
oe-lent detailed ,tudy see ~ Jorge Gutiürez, • El 5istema Político y I• bu.raesl.a. 
ru.r•I en M&:ic« d CtiO <k".I Meiq,uit.i.1 •. in R«vuu, /.luicana d~ Soci.o!ogi4, 
Vol XXIX, No. J, 19"Tl. 
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h•ve a bett~r npprcciation of t.he role Msigned to the A,my, CA 
and military professionalizauon must be considered as pheno-
mena inl irnntely related between thcniselves and a, the same 
Lünc with US miJitary assistance . 
B. · Tlie gorilla "-' a So cial Workcr 
CA began in a n1odem, that is 1 an antisubvf" .. rsive. seuse in 
197 1. Tts spparent objec,ive was Lhat o[ helpiog the civilian 
populauon by means of free services : medkal and dental visit.s, 
veterinarian sen 1ices, etc . The true goal \vas that of « pacifj .. 
caúon o: by coolributing simultancously in general to capitalist 
econornic deveJopmeaL (poJitical ~tebility) and in particular, to 
prcventing armed or unarmed subversion . lls objective was ,o 
eliminntt. or 01 leas1 10 dirnimsh the possibility of the armed 
subvcrsive rr1ovcn1e.r1ts' obtaining more reclutes. AL the sarne 
lime it w-~s ab le to collecr information tha t was used 10 elabc,. 
rate rnore deu:llJed socio-e,couomic studies, which ín turn facili 4 
tated the localizatic,n of possible outbreaks of opposition and 
the t.aking of preventive measures. Mexico's ltaders could not 
risk Lhat the •rmed opposition, which was stilJ geographically 
well located, might $pread to Other sta1<,s. This siluation called 
for another ingredient which would make repression more effi-
oiém, CA consrnu1ed a perlect element (") . Now, only Guerrero 
has 1he « prkilege • of receiving such aid . This .js due 10 the 
fact that CA \vas more abJe to cover its objectives in arcas where 
the guerrilla still hnd not mken roo1. 
Jn Guerrero wheri, SL wa, ~onfront~d with an armed move-
ment tha1 already enjoyed a relative degree of popular suppoH, 
the.rc :u-e indic-ations ('') which make us think that as a forro 
of rnediaLion it failed comple1<:ly. 
( 51) CA W1Uo not proacramm(';() only (or Goer~ro . hut 1oolt pllce also in 
O.x:3ca., Tlar.cll.i, Chihuahua. Sin•loa, Ol.mpcéhc and MoreJos; howc,vtr. In 
thcse statffc it wa.s ncver practk.ed witb lhe &a..me dcJ .n'.e ot lnien.shy 3.$ Jn 
Gucn-cro . 
(.52) Por ex'i\mpJe, lhe. JS,000 soldicrs whlch ttmi in l!,177 OOC\IJ:)ted the" \tate , 
,1.1, wcll as tbc 33 ctnlhon dollo.rs providetl by t.he US (iu aln,.1.Anes, bfi,Jicopters, 
i.ndividuaJ armnmenl , photograpb.ic cqlllpmcnl, etc .) rrom J97l ~ 1977 for 
combatm¡ agaln$l drug traffic. Thi• traf6c does cxist in severa! !tafl~s. pl"ioo-
ip.aJJy 1n Gttt"JTCro; nevcrtbdcss, t.here is no a,ntJ1Ml.icti<.10 betv:oen ac.dvtllcr. 
untl~rt.ak.r,o to combat real and •social• traftic. quite the contra.ry: they 
comp1emmt e:Kh ol)'w.r. Thru provis.ioru. wer'(': JlOt rC<',éh'Cd by lht Army bu t 
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lnd epcndent ly oí the cor reclncss of th ls general evaluation 
concoming CA, there is no doubt tha t thh acitvily did permil 
• on Lhc job » trni mng. The CA brigudes we.re m~de up of 
studen ts fwrn díffereot proíessionol educa ,iomu centers (docturs, 
nun.c:~. etc). technic ions (ve terinarians. inst ruch)rs in anti 5Ulr 
vcrsive activities, etc .) proíeswrs, instructor~ nnd regular troops. 
The magnitud oí thc SL activities ar.com¡>lished in four years 
( 1971-74: especially in 73} was impressive: more 1han 300,000 
vnccination,, alrno"il l 111illion medica] visirs, t>lc. See Table J. 
The knowledge obtained thro ugh the mih taxy educ.alional sys-
te m, both for future pruf'css ionals and technki ans as well as [or 
specialists in nntisubvcrsivt. 11.c1ivJties, had lou nd an excelJenl 
labora1ory fot prnctical appli catio n. CA and profess ic,nalizatl on 
are double-,,dged instrumenu: one, puts the soldiers in contact 
with the terrible J'Utal misery , tho secood offors them supe rior 
dements for unders1andit1g Me,ico's social reality, in spite of 
t.he ideologjcal cCJntenl or noo-milirary courscs (history, Jaw, 
etc.). The fctling of repulsion that can come M a result of 
carrying OUL repressjve actious h, another means of increasing 
po lili,-al sensitivity During the past admioisuation (1971-76) 
CA-répression-prc,fessionalization were a common trio . 
. 
C - The Co,üla as a high levtl professional 
Profcssionafüation is composod of the foJlowing ekments : 
education, modemization of technical mil itar y equipment and 
of tran spor ta tion and improvem•nt oí physical lnstallations. 
Throughout Echeverrí•'• adminhtration, educallon received an 
attention \Villtour prtceden,t. in alf Mexico's military bistory. 
ln 1973, for t.he hrsl time in lhe General $t3 ff ColJ,oge's (Escue la 
r.i1bcr hy the Pt>deraJ AUorn~y Gct1tr•l's O!flce; bowcver botll otra'(liutlonr; 
work togcth~r ar1inst the drua trafOe. Snch provi5ion1 C'Oll'Npoud w 1he 
As1i1tenot Pro1ram o! the FDl'.s • Dru.a Enforoemtn1 Adm1nis-lrauon • , Unhtd 
States, HourA" ot Rcpn:S<:l)talives, • Forei11n A!.Slttcoc.c and .Rtlated A¡en.cieg, 
App ro¡'.lrlation\ ror l977 •. He.aring ~{ore a i.ubco:rruniuce. t1f tl1e Com mluee 
on Appropriat1<.1ns, 94th Cooa,.s,;, lud Session, Parl r. pr 6&~. Anothcr 
souroe sustains that durln1 lhi ; samr. ~iod tbe Au orney Gentra.l's Offk .c: 
reccived ,nor~ Lban 47 mlUlon; Lhat /or 1978 ir rcceh•cd mor11t lhan JO milUc,n 
aod ror 1979 13.S rn\llion art projOC'.led, Soe: • U.S ,,Mtoxlco: Mili tary Suildup • 
in NACLA'S latJ11 Attuirican & E.'mpir1 Rtpurt: _pubHadon of North America n 
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Supcd.or de Guerro) curriculuttl a course in Müitary ond Huma : 
nities Juridh:..al Jnves tigation \VM gi~·en (by menns of a series 
of lecturcs) in order to fur:tber the lmowledge of high leve! 
co=ders in the undestanding of • Nacional Doctrines• {°'). 
A very distiogui shcd gronp of lectures participated: Public Works 
and lnterior Secsetaries, outstancUng representalives of the world 
of lndustry , Comn1P.rcc. aod Fin.anee. and university professors. 
In 1974 a Cmnputer Sermnar was held to prepare higbly q11alifü:d 
pen;onnel to manage the ultra-mod ero computer system. The 
Military Educational Reform Plan, begun in 1971, bad as its 
objective the elevation of 1he Army's professional leve). with 
~mphasis on low and middle leve! commands. New schools 
(Educittion, lntendcocy and Adminlsrration, etc.) and Courses 
(Daniloscope, ·y, A.ir Photogramctry etc.) wcrc estab!Jshed to 
help reach thi• obj ective . SlUdies offored in the Officer6' School 
(Nursi.ng , War Materinls , etc .) were raised to the level of high 
school. The Milirary School of Classes (for first and second 
sargents) held • series of lectures aboul commanding small 
units. as \vell as an [ntensivc Transnlis:sions Course. Firsl Sar# 
gents partici.patcd in on lntensive Course for the Fonnalion of 
Second Lleutenents, held in the Military College (Mexico's Wr.st 
Point) . This whole process culmina,cd in 1976 with rhe Military 
University's founch1tion ('") 
US trainlng played a cardi11al role in this process of profes-
sional_iiation Bctween 1967-72, 19é> me.n in uniform rcceived 
training in americao schools or in 1he Paoama Canal Zone ; froro 
1973·77, aoother 193 soldiers went to study ("') . See Table U. 
Upon tbcir retum to Me><ico, those who have receivcd spccial 
training work not only in their respective fíelds, but - what 
is even rnore inrportanl - as 1eachers in different mihtary 
schools. This high degree of profession,li,.ation does not remain 
(S!) Thcinie of somc l~turci, werc: • StruCttlrc: of A1exico's St.ate • • Naüonel 
Pla.nnJna • • Ad.minisLtative Reínnn • • Covcmment's Pro¡nm .. ~te ., Rnils1 0 
del E;,r,:üo, Op. Cit., Oetober 19'/4, v . 19. 
(S4) For 9Clhools creatcd in 1976, $0e: BMthtor . 9/ lll/ 76. 19·A :sud YJ{Vl/76, 
14,A. for those eXiadng unliJ J97S, see : Pifteyro, Oµ. Cit., • El Profes1ooal •.. •, 
•· m. (SS) fbjd. Table XVt . nnd U.S. House: of RepreaentaUW.$, • Foreign,. •. 
Op, l.~it., p. 1300. Mexfco's mjUta.ry p1c.k:t.ee for 1978 mtluded th,e tralnin¡ vt 
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only at a theoretical lev<!l, ns, since 1971, each milit:u y zot1e 
has he)d special scn1cst~r exercises in order to pul into practlce 
these new teachings. 
Considrrablc s tep s werc also t•ken in r.he logis tical aspec t: 
from 1971 to 1974, 7150 helgian rifles a 11d machine·guns were 
bought, in addition to millio ns oí cartridges au d spa re pons. 
Other minor im¡,ort. Hions of individual armament arrived from 
Notth A.mCI;ca. During Gen. Cuenca Di3,z's adminii:.tration at 
the SDN, purchases oí equiprnent for the Air For ce reoched an 
ali-time lrigh ('"'). Tbe Ai,· Force it;elf has synthesüed the magni · 
tude of Lhese provisions ("): 
The number of airplanes adquired Ls gre:ner ,han that 
o[ Lhe last 30 years combine d.. In addition to these ad-
quis itioni;, we mus t ment.ion that existing mate 1ta] has 
been undergoing rcpa it, whlcb has enabled u, ro put 
into operating condition~ more airplanes than any othcr 
period . 
From 1975 to 1977, tbe American govemmenl propo,~ioned 
five million dollars ann ually in cted,t for purch ase.s: these lS 
million dollars is a quantity without precedence in 1he history 
of US military aid to Mex·ico ("). T,h.is constHutes a qualitalive 
as well as quantitnt-ivc increas;e. By taking into cons tderatiun 
the changos whlch have occurred withín the Arm y and its reccnt 
purchasing pattem, we c.an sup pose that these loans have bcen 
used ' t0 obtain tech11ologically advnnced equipme. m (oomputer 
tS6) too .tlrplaoes, 34 heJK'opters rar dJ.ftcrc:n1 uJes, upec.ia lly tlto5e dedicar, 
cJ h.) eountt<.rinsur¡cucy and trt'OJ> tranipOrt; thc$e came trom lsrac l, 'f'rance, 
England 11.nd prl.nclpaJly [rom Ute US; "'-C m·u.st a.h:o m.ention 30 a.irplaoes whlch 
hac1 becn re.palred a,nd ~ui¡x:,d whh oew moWT$, h) be ~c:d in 1.'.0unterinsur· 
gcni:y acth hJes. Pif1eyro, pp. 178-179, Or,. CIL • El Yh>fl!Stona.l .. • a.od ln ttt · 
nttionaJ. 1nstltutc ror St~~gie Studies . .. Milltiry a ati:1.nce tm- 1978. Loodon· 
Adl-.nd & !,ou, Ltd, p. 71. From 1977 h> 1978, la airplancs wc:re boo¡ht for 
rranspor, , IS Cor ~i:lunttrintur gcncy. as wtU a.ii 2 helic:oflte:r'j, a.lso 12 P.c?'s ror 
tra.iuina: e.re on ol'der Set: Jbid . .. Military B,111.nec 1978.1979 •, p. 1S. Anc,rhet 
sou~ re-v<'al.$ the e:!listence of a secrrt aartement wilb North America to óbl ain 
16 :.uper tnodP..m tt.5 combal jets at a c:oSl c,f ISO ,nillior, dollar1 . Scc: • u.s .. 
Mc-.iú,.o Mllhary ... • Op. Cit •• p. 40. 
(51) Rt..,i.fta di!I Ej,rt.'ito y la Furrio Airr.a, Sepr. 1974, Op. C,t ., p, 88 
(58) Fo:r Joa.n.s of 1950-197• ~e; Pii\eyro, • et Profesional ... •, Op. Cit., T•ble 
XXVll. For thos~ ot 197S.J9n. s:ee: ... U.S. ll ou.se of Repreicn1.auvt's .. • Op. 
CII., p. 11!7. 
14.2 
sys~ms) aod hcavy equipmen1 (airp lanes, lwlicopt<'rs) not pro-
duced in Melcico. 
From 1950 to 1977, almost 900 m"xitan soldiers and poli-
cemeI1 were trained by North Ameríca; mili tary and police as· 
,;stanc-e for tbe same pe,,iod was 70 nrillion doll ars (") . 11 is 
nece,ssaiy to point out thu t more tha n 50% (that is, 477 offícers) 
of the above menlioned pcrsonnel corr.,.pon ded to Lhe decade 
betwcen J 966 a nd 1977; officinl police u·aining began in J 968 
an~ until 1972, 67 mcn had heen traine d. Of the total quan!ity 
of 1ni1i1.ary assista.ncc pf'ovidcd, n1ore Lhnn 60% \Yns received 
during this same period . 
The Secretary of De-fense resumes 1n this m21nner those 
benefi ts gíven 10 r.he Am, ed lnstitute in Echeverría's admin istra-
tion: 1) sa lary inc.rease 2) fringe benefit~: homin g, chaln of 
st ores ScDcNa, bette r medícal attent10n an d an increase in pcn-
sions 3) i111prove 1nent in educ.;1tlon and in spor ts faci litie s 4) 1ni· 
lítary legislation has been brou ght ur co date 5) rotatíon of 
commands, promotions, decontioru; 6) • a higher degree of so-
cial integrati<,n for military mcn and tbeir f,unilies • (th at is, 
an Lncreas ing poliuca l assirrulat,on an d a po tential social ah· 
sorption) 7) renovation of transportation and Lnstallati ons 
8) crca tion <>f new units 9) and • espedally, thc brilliant oppo r· 
tun1ty whjcL the Arme<l Forées have had ,o directly serve the 
people to whicb it belongs • ("'). Thc SON leader's final touch 
is st upe ndous· profess ionalization and « popular» SL. In less 
euphem istic (e,ms, Lhis ímplied the initiation of CA,counter -
guerrilla activities, lo<"alization and control of the regime's op· 
positio n, mediatization, cte. and a prac1icaJ test for 1he constanl· 
ly increasing prof~s ional know ledge. 
1n order to resume the lnilicia's iJnprovemeuts in Lhe past 
administration, Jl is necessary lo return to Gen. García Bar.rngán'$ 
(SDN Secretary in 1970) farewell speech . first., he ind.íc.ated tbe 
lack of a War Doctrine , whlch he defined as • t.he cr~•tion, pre 
paration and leader.,hip "f the Armed Forces »; aud ,hen he 
mentioned sorne essentíal points in developiog such a Do<.~ 
ttfoe (' 1 ) : 
(S9). • UaS.Mex.:ico Müitary ... >, Os,. Ch .• pp, 4íM3. 
(60) Rtvi8ra del Ejtlrci.to y de la Fue,1.a A.hea, $cpL 19?J, Pt>, 43,.44. 
(61) R"1Ulp 'di./ Ejlrc:ito, Ju.ne l910, Halit,. odded. 
\ 
1} Organize brigades and divisions 2) increase Lbe LrOOps' 
corabative capacity 3) i11,truct th~Jn in every possible 
way for large seale actions. with •-pecial emphru.is on a 
new type, irregular War, indispensable aspec.t o( every 
rnodem anny 4) crea1ion of its own oetwork o[ services 
to assure its subsislence S) organize the comrnands o( 
large units {Brigades and Divisions) which, if there is a 
real io1ention of using them, should be fonned as soon 
as possible. bu• underlining that the sjmpJe fact of organ· 
izh1g them \\'as not e.nough, élS ít ,vas fírst nccessary to 
prepare thent, since it is n1ore economic:.al to prepare 
aommands and tr<Jops in time ol peace tban Lo improvise 
them in time of war. 
Gar'Cla Borntgán consideren 1haL during lns ndmuústration 
the hrst four points had been developed, bue that the [ifth point, 
a very essent.iaJ one, still needed to be enacled. Thfa cvaJuat.ion 
gives us a synU1esis of tbe professional advances made under 
Pres. Dín.z Ordaz (1964-70} and the key to analyzing Echeverrfa' .s 
admlnistralion: theoretical and practica! preparntlon of com-
nmnds, by mea.ns c,f the growing education .al system and CA 
exercises, as weJI R"5 ,viLh normal and emergency services . During 
Echeverrfa' .s adrnini,;tratjon , the Anny was not only able to 
const1 uc1 a highly prepared cornma.nd 11e1work, bu1 also a b le 
to perfect 1he first four poiats mentioned by García -qarragán. 
Ar 1his rnorntnt, J -Miould likr tt1 maki- public. an 
evolutio,i in my thinA.·ing.. Soo'alisrn is a gene1·a/ artd 
respectable movtmt.nr in all the world wllich c011not 
bt dtfeuted. , The progre.s.5 of rhe wortd ir in the 
hands of the !>'OCl'nliJts 
Words of Gen. Felipe Angeles, dJ:,-Offic~r in tht 
army ot Portuio Dla.:;, a few momenrs bf!/ore bein¡ 
extctllcd O.'f Jtccmd in c.'ornttcand of Francisco Villa., 
after being tried and convrcted by tite A1ihtary Tri· 
bwial o/ th~ aovr.rnnien..t o/ Pre.sident Ca.rranta. 
D. The military pn:,fe.!3ÍOl'Ulfüation : its political potencialities 
Political repercussions of tl,e Anny's new professions and 
tecbnical specialitit.s, should be divided into l:Wo 1ypes: those 
serviccs wh-ich it can ofíer to the society and 10 the State, and 
those for tbe milttia as an instllutlon. In Mexko 's contempo-
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rary history, therc already exist precedcnts of these firnt {''); the 
rnost rccent happened in 1976 whcn elcctric:il workers of the 
Democratic Teudcncy tbrcateoed 10 call a nat.ional strike. Th~ 
Army announced that it was willing and able to partially substi-
tule these workers in strategic elccrrical oenters in order to mnin-
tafo the electriea .l system in working order. Mcn in uniform 
eannol substitutc aJJ those workers or professionols on strike , 
but they can exercise baste political fuuctions in the telr.graph 
and telephone companies, etc. or in other service areas such 
as !hose proport.ioned by graduales in medicine, den1istry a.11d 
other ru~,v specialities of' tl1e MiJitary University. Given a coup 
d 'état of short or long duration , ct'.rtain officers could carry 
out a lieries of functions in m:maging pubUc or .~emi·public 
enterprises (") or as chancellors o[ universities c,r directors of 
different academic departmenls as now happens in some latín 
aroerican. countries. 
Considering thc diversiry of spedalities and profossions, we 
suppose lhal at prese.nl the Arrny d~s no1 ne.:d to re...-ur to 
civili~n technicians, and less and less to professionals. There 
even exists a plan for self-~ufficicncy in agdcultural products by 
means of an expanding system of fanns, install ed on milita,,. 
lands , who~ excess produc1s will be used to help poor peas · 
ants ( .. ). The política] potenciaU1y of 1hese innovallions should 
be considered on two levels: in critica! moments whicb would 
not necessarily condude in a co11p d'érat, or when 1he miUtJ;o 
a$sumes dírect political panicipation in the State's direction. 
A decade ago, this multitude of servicies now offered by tbe 
A.rmed lnstitute would have been inccmceivablc, as well as ,ts 
growing aulonomy wlth respect to ctvilian technicians and pro-
fesslonals and in gent.ral with respect to other kinds of provlslon -
ing from the civil society. 
(62) For ex.amf!)e, io 1952, m.ilita.ry technicians aubt.tltu1cd ,trJk.ing em· 
~loycc,. ot Téléfonos de México; in 1958 &.bey did tbe sa.m.t, this tirr~ maintalno 
u1a tl)e. teJea,rapb se.rvito in operauon. 
{63) Memoria. Sept. J.973,Au¡u,a 19'14, Op. C".Jt., p . 4S. luteN:,Li.n¡ speec.h In 
which hlah lcvcJ rommauders rrcog_nize lb.e widc rang<" o! set vi~ ilCll related 
to nric:tly military q_uc,tio?)S. 
(64) 1his began in JuJy, 197). Cuenca l>fai 01'<1.ered tbe iru.taUation of a 
fann ·on each mUJtarY ba.se aod boain.n.i.oa in Ft'bninry 1'176, be a.nn!.luncert pl.uu 
to i:ovest a lOtal o{ 34 mill!OJi pesos In th.ls proJecl. B.xclbior, 1.9/Jln6, p. 16. 
\ 
1'o detect the Anned Forces' política! p3rticip.ttion in Lt1tin 
Amenca, .foreign and nat.ion~I re:.earchers bave tTadjaion.'.llly U$ed 
three indicators. Firsl o! all, 1he Armed Forces' budget in rela-
lion to the natioua1 one, the proportion of tbe former ex.pres.sed 
in te:rms o( the g_ross nationa l product, etc. l 'h1s con$titutes a 
partíal cnterion fot Mexico. as mnny small and médium funds 
are 1101 includcd in 1J1c official budb"'l ("). Anotl1er crit.,rion í• 
that \.Yllich refcr5 fú an incn~ase or decl'e•1r.e in the Armed Forces' 
n1c1nber~. which should not be intt:rpreted .in a mccharuc.al man· 
ne·r, but r..tther os a general indicator or an increment in: J>O~ 
1cnci:il1ty, di.-ect participation or in the military's política! pre-
senc.e, three distinct though inr...:rdependent le\ 1els; even so, iL 
is necessa,·y to poin1 ou1 Lil•t i11 the Jnsl four years, Lilere has 
been o considerable numeriC'll growth in the SDN's depen-
deots (''). The 1hird indicator ha• to do with th~ number of 
pre.~idc-:nls or statc governors oí miH1ary ori~. Hov,cvcr, their 
presencc in llself i~ not a rrus1worthy gwde line, and cven less 
so in ,\1.exico's ca!tC. 
In addilion to these common 1ndica1.on), ,ve propOst! sorne 
CA'tra, more spe::cifíc ones. ·rJ1e first , relatt":d to the Am1y's poli. 
ricaJ presence, has 10 do wilil 1hose recen! fringe benefüs and 
salary increascs enjoyed by the SDN; even though rh.is indkator 
cau¡;es di fficu lt ies because of 1he lack of lmowledge about !.he. 
Armed Forces' total budget, a detai led study oould throw some 
light on this subject. For now, ils political presence is easier to 
loc.aliu if we take into consider•tion one fundamental eveut: 
the c-,0nstn1ction of tl1e rnooumental l\1ilitary University \Vhose 
cost rerr1ain5 top secret, bu L \\•hich must have surpassed hu.nd· 
(6S) C.0Vt'ted íor CXIW1J>1c by the TN!lliiury OC'p;a.rtmMt., a6 t~ the caR 
w1lb o:ulita:ry ptJl.,1uns; chis Oei,artmc:nr provides pan ar 1hc funds for thc 
receni.Jy e.,1abli.sbcd A.nned forces' Scicial Security lnsdtulc . E>'.C,lsior, '11,/V / 
'16, 1-A or by ot.bet sin:.\.11 revolving funds whid) •~ ulOd lo flnant.:c lotc:mal 
pro¡ranl.$. $jo« l91J, the SON has recdved .i l'Ot.al o( almost l(i mllUon p~~, 
and another un,-~ífici~ qua.nlity In orde.r ll,, conttnu::t a rest hou1e f<.11 
cld.erly ioldien . • Th<' above mcntloned qu.ntilic.s i.11td othtrs whlch are 1101 
mtntioned htre ... are not includtd In 1.he buc1.te1 oí thls Minbtr)' • , Cucr1c.) 
Dlu concludcd. El DI•. 29/lln6. ~ 17, i1allcs ,ddod. 
(66) The SDN increased fts depe.nden1.s rorrn (IJJXIJ in 1973 to 18)))1') in 1977. 
The Ni1VY 6om 8.500 in l%6 10 19,CMXt in J976: "MUitaey BaJ:an~ .1977-1978 • 
Oµ. Cit. This of Ctour15e, c.autl."d !t qualha.tlvc lnata.sc Jn lts hcJUcosc 1."fJ.J)acity. 
Sce; ExcJ.l.tíor 2/Vlnó and I/Vlll/76 . ftom 1966 10 J97a thr. Armcd force& 
inettascd form 68,000 to '/7 J)O() membett . 
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reds of millions of pc$OS: ,r cost more thai, 80 miJlion pe.sos 
Just to build Lile Mililáry Medica! School', new installoúons, 
s itualoed ourside of !he Universily ("). The Military University's 
erection shows the gruwi11g polilical presence of the men in 
uniform; lhis insiitu l ion is a visible rcsult of 1beir pres.sures to 
ubtaín a bctte r social siaod.ing, gr~.ater prestige and impo11anc" 
within the State and th~ Society. lt does no1 signify a dlrec1 
political pnrticipation, bu! an undeniuble prewnce, reLribut ion 
for differenL services rendered duri 11g thc las! Jecade. 
Other more specific. tl101 i~ peuonal retributions can be 
C'.Onsidered as an ind ication oí direc1 poliucal participation. 
Cuenca Díaz's self-nominalion as gubernatorial c.tndldate in Baja 
California cannc,l be jurJged jusi as a daring move on thc pa11 
of an old politician and member i11 good standing ol Lile bureau-
cracy's miUuuy branch, but rather as a sigr, of his perso nal 
sec urity of cou1·Jting on definite support withio rJ1e PRJ. There 
a.,e three other governors of mililary orígin with ieng lhy politicnl 
histories. Gen. Fernando Pá.mcncs, governor ot Zacatecas, (ex-
congressman and alLernale ,enator); Col Rogelio flores C'uriel 
of Ñayari1 (e•·senator and ex-Federal Districl l'olicc Chief in 
197 1, fired aftcr Lile June 10 studen1 massacre) and Gen Ellseo 
Jiméncz Rtili, of Oaxacn (ex-congressman, who b<,came goveraor 
by presldential des ignation, due lo civil disturbances whlch oc· 
cu rr ed in Lilis state in 1977) who had already .sacce.ssiully liqul-
dated the guerriU, in Guerrero. Auotlier indicato,· which can be 
used to detoct a direc-t poliúc:al par1idpation is that of ihe gro up 
of representativcs and senators (var ing in numbor but always 
preie nl ) tn tbe National Congress and in other pos.itions cor¡i-
monly held by men in uoiform ("). The,;c, 1oget her with those 
assigned to diffcrent jobs within the PR 1, make up !he liaso.n 
' 
l6n E.-«:6/&'io,. 3/J.X/76, 9-A. 
(68) Chler, of p0Uee and pri.wo dírocLorS; ancthcr way or ai>rox.i.IN:1Sr1.11 
polhical p:,niclJ>adon would bt 10 know how many mf'n in unJionu hold 
posititJn$ within tbe l'RJ or in thc buteau.craUcadlnin1strath1e appantu.s. ln 
1970, JO mHitn.ry officers o.:o:-upied inlenncdJ.at~ positions: Chie.t or PoJicc ot 
lht'I ct1pJta.t. Gcnl'Tlll Hiahway Director. Gcner.:il Spom Director iu th(' D.F.; 
Fedtnl Sccurity Drrec.tor oí tlle Interior ,\iinistcry; Atnb.lsud<lr in Ecuador, 




gl'Oup between the State's armed nnd pohtical inslitu tes . We 
suppose tha t simi lar rolu o.re play~d by tbe high commands of 
the Presidential Guards' General StafC. 
Concluilo u:S. 
ln lhe consolidat ion and evolution of tbe modern ,Mexican 
State, its military branch played a bas ic role not only m accom -
plisbing normal coercive funct ions , subjugahng lhe social clas· 
ses and/or scttors of classes which were contra,y to tbe newbom 
centra l power, but also as a po litical·ideological institulio n wbich 
t.ontributed great ly ,o the construction and support <>f lhe of· 
ficial one-party system . At the ,;,ame time, it carried out a more 
amp le ideo logical funotfon, pre.sentir1g itself to the people as a 
Revolu,;oo ory Army, heir to tt,c best 1.radit.ions of the Mexican 
Revolution. 
Dilfercnt fr,iclions of the rleveloping rullng class appea led 
to the Army on repeated occasio ns ín thcir nu merous internal 
controversies ; however, the existence of a mc.chanism of checks 
and balances pem1iHed both tbe defcal oí the civil and military 
fractions which had préferred to solve lheir contr adictions by 
violent meaos; and simultaneously the consolidauon of J.he ideo · 
Jogical-polltical tools of contro l over the workíng class and spe · 
eia)Jy, ,he conlinuation of rnllitary profe,,ionalization, princípal-
ly in its bureuucratic-0rganizational and ídeolog,cal asp<'.ct. Al 
the same time it madc possib le an íncrcase in the State's mil l-
tary capacíty to repre~s workers ami peasan ts who fought against 
the offic.ial mech1U1isms of control . 
A, Lhe same time that the supeí$ tru ctur11I Jnslit ution s were 
being consolida ted, the military branch carne to occLtpy a se-
condary position in Lhe Slate's dírectíon _ The bureaucr.icy's 
civil branch filled this void , withnut ever « forge tting to take 
good ca.re • of tho•e cornma .nders (high ,ahuies, otl,cr Eringe be-
nefits , etc .) who cou ld garantee a disciplined behavior by the 
Army nnd a constant proc css of profoss ionnlization. Iri this way 
a cer ta.in « status quo • was establishcd between the State's mi-
litary and política! institutes. trny dass or s,.ctor ,hereof or 
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political personality tha1 lhrea ,cned this uew situation =;,ívcd 
in answer, depcndin¡¡ on the s¡,ecíflc situation, its incorporation 
into the ¡ystem, its nculralization or a prúportion.al dose of 
repressjon . 
Gen. Henriquez Guzmari was the last prominenl man in 
unifonn to t.hreaten the a.hove rnentioned • statu.~ quo •. The 
ofücial party (PRT)-Govemment , tbe Department of Def<.'nse and 
ali the State appara tus cou )d not stand this challenge ; tl1ese 
organi1J1tio11$ Jet loose al! lhe weíght of theix combine.J power 
against Henríquez's popular mas•""· Aíter 1he election ca01paígn 
oí 1952, not only the gene rals but also the PR I-Governmcnt re-
flecte.el on this reccntly « resolved • poli1ical threat . A mutu•Uy 
satisfacto 1y solution was found in tbe consolidat,on of a liason 
group betwe.en the Sta te's military and política! insti lutes by 
means of which lhe rnilitary men could cluwnel theír requests 
and persnnal political ambítions . 
Also, in 1952, che form of ruilitary assistcnce oí the Uníted 
Sta1es to rhe Mexican Arm y became more clearly defined; this 
m.-ant the ~jecliion of any milito.ry aid (such as dona tions or 
loans of technical-milirary equipment) which was cooditioned 
by the acceptance of bilateral tre.aties that couJd compromise the 
country in actions of war against other nations . Ho\.\•ever. the 
north american military aid ( such as traínírig and ·sales or ere· 
dits for the purchase of equjpment) has always been acceptt.d 
in uccordance with the necessities of the Army' s professionali-
iatio n . 
We hav• shown the dose re.lationship betwecn growíng rm· 
litary pro(essionali,m and the class struggle ín it., differcnt ma· 
nifestations , as well as th.is profes,ionahsm's partial dependence 
on U.S. militnry assistaocc, both in tralrung and in equipme nt . 
Such training has r.onfirmed that tbere cxis ts a dírect línk bet-
ween ccrtrun selected course.• of st u<ly (as well as annam cnt 
and technical equi¡,ment purcl1ased) and the nec.e,ssítfe., which 
in eacb particular moment the popular strugg les have made 
evident. Examples of thi~ relationsbip were examined with re• · 
pect to the critk.al períods of 1958-59, 1967-69 and 1971-75. 
Presently , ihe Jogistic depeodence on the United States no 
lc;,nger exists with respect to small arnts wh ich are now nation-
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ally protluccd , under II Belgian pateot thnt was boug ht in or der 
to manufacture automatlc rifles and machinc>-guns. Small war 
l>oats are also produce<! in Veracruz's port under anothel· patent; 
there are plans under way to prod u,~e spare parts for dúferent 
aircrafts pu rchased from foreign coun trie~ and in so doiog di · 
minls h this dcpendeace, no L only on North Amerka but also on 
othcr supp Jiei,s { .. ). 
The second level of tlepende nce, that is 1 he ideolog,cal-po li· 
tica l one. is very difficult ro eval uate. We caonot accept thal 
all milhary personnel wilh U.S. tmining return to Mexico as 
unc:onditionaJ agtnts oí Jmµeria lism. If such v.·ere the. case, ou r 
Army would huve begun LO be denatJonalized as eaily as 1948, 
when Presiden! Alemán removed r.he soldiers of the old guard 
from posit..ions ol command and s ubsti .tuted them with 1hose 
who had been educated in Mexico and bad later specialized in 
the Unitoo Sta tes. To speak of ideological depeodence ooly pe.r · 
mit s us to kno\Y sorne! characteristics of Irnperi alisna's antisub-
versive tecltnique, and thereíore the polit..ical object..ivP.S which 
some not exclusj\,ely antisu.bversive cow ses purs ue. Beyon d 
that, everyt hin g is specu lat ion, especially with respect to the 
Mexic-.an Army, wbere lhe local iuition o[ interna! polit ical ten· 
dencies ,s at best very diffjcult. 
Neverthele,s . it Is necessary to po in t ou t that th e majority 
ot the. military ione commanders an d other commai,d pe.rsoone l 
have. received training or have madc official trips to thé Ame, 
rica o Unioo , in 1976, thosc promoted to other high c.ommands, 
such os the Under-Secretary of the SDN, ha d s imila r back· 
gro uud s. From 1971 to 1976, hundreds of generala. i nter rnediate 
and Jow ranking offlcers were di sch a, ged from the Army, to 
malee way for more professionalized elements {10 ). We must take 
,mo consideration that ("): 
(69) f'Ot' dr.taiJs abouL ,man arms pf(>ductian, sr:e: E.uilsior . 7{V/76, JO.A. 
Púl Wonnadon about ~nn.s productlon in underdrr.·etoped COW'llries form 1965 
to 1975. e MiUtary Bt.lance 1976-·77 •. Op. Cit., p. U. Tbi.s: ,ame M,Ul"U fia.,; 
dctalJs abouJ smaU w.ar boals' production. For lhc . pJan.nc-d pm jcc t ,óf produc-
ln¡¡: ~u'tlr<lft 5Pa.tt part~ $te: S,ci;,lsiof, 28/ VTl/76, 3-A 
(70) El Diu '1.9/11/16, p. 17. 
(71) Ko,..,k, Op CiL, p. l!lb. 
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As always happens with nny social scientific predir.:ation, 
in e.use of an iniUa l differcnt i::ation within th t Armed 
Fo,·c<'~. the greates t difíiculty resides in making a clear 
distinc tion be tween those tendenc ies whic h have only a 
tempo ral. limited infJucnce . nnd those wh ich can lead 
to a real change bnsed on long range, obj~clive COD· 
ditions . 
In recen, decade s, there has appeared sume evidcnce of 
natáonalilitic altit udes , but not of defiincd Le.ndencics ("). The 
Secretary of Defense ( 1965,70) . ínsistod on the exclusive part i· 
dpa tion of mc>.ican military persoüllel in the formation o[ a 
War Doc tru, e, eve.n though he recognized that tcachings rcceived 
in foreign coun trle~ could helJ> accomplish rhis goal However , 
thi.s same leader ,vas a fen ,en t aoticomm unis:t ('ª), a dic-hard 
defender oF thc • MeJtican Revolutíon •. This kind of bourgeois 
nat iona lism is very limited in scopc and lndced , pxoimpcrlal · 
ist ("), b<!cause il tacitly accepts Mexico's mililáry Md econo m,c 
dependence . 
(71.) For e.xample: l\1cúco'.s rclus.al to ac.cept * ooudhiontd north amea·kan 
miUtary ¡:nw t in 1952 and th~ torm.~dOJ'I of a»d bc.r pa.n.iclpetio u iu the OAS'i; 
hnerarn,rican Peacc Foroo in 1965 tn 1972, .aftt"r- retuntlna from a , 1udy uip 
throuab Baja Cautumin, s1udents; of the General Sta!! Cc'))l,:ge teportcd ¡row-
lng for'Eia:n peneu,tio o t.n tJtpJoitio¡ natural and lQllriSl Yeso~. whi..:b w!".re • 
Jn da.ns;er o{ bcing 1alitcn Q\.'U cxclu.sl\'e:Jy by priva.te c.idtenr. and U.S. enter · 
priS:C!o, R.wi.,ta d.~1 Eíhci.to, January l973, Op. C.h., p . 8. E~·cn though thi .s 
cou.stitu,~ th c: oply such Snst1ncc of dcnu.ndatJo n pubUshod 1n an.y n1iJita.ry 
prtsl (197176), h oou]d be eXJ)la.jJl.t.d by Echevcrría's ,; Tblrd Wc.irtd • st)'Je or 
by a natloua.list 1endency whlch may be d~·elopin.¡ among the Ccner'3l Staff 
CoUc¡e's young otttcers and a..-nerals. In J97S, Mcd;o 's Anny did no t accept 
an invita tJoo 10 participa,e ln che Xl Cooten:noe ot American Armics held in 
Montevideo; .:onfere.nce, proino ted ai,d ~ooollc:d by the Pentagon . ' 
(13) Thc Secretat} of t')c(ense e)t.,pt'C)sed that a .S(:ne.5 of ft:t:tu1-ef about thl'! 
Mi,lUC"an Re\'Olutlon•t PhHoso;dUc Doc:uine , MJd in lbe GCJ.ll".ral Sta!f C<1.1llq:R. 
cou Jd h.eJp itc participa.nts to rcal iu th.at: 
Our re"\!oludon ha, IÍVffl us lhc op_µor-tunity to li\•e n, thi$ prescnt 
00:ndJUon of íncrc.i.sio.¡ p~~ ... and 10 countc-rre$t any offan:dve 
uodertake.o aa1.loi l her b)' mar,Jsm·lenutis.m ttnd by oon~TWtive 
ldea.s. ... 
Rcvi.st4 del EJi r-clto. Octubet ' 1970, p 6 
(74) Ga.rda Ban-a¡á.n impUcltly accll!lf't".d Mt'1:Jro's de.pendenc mUiuuy (.ha1" ..-
aetll'r ln a .spcecb ¡jvcn bcfore lhe Tnt.emmeri,:ao ~feme Council, BoUs, O:, 
P"t ., p , 163. Mowcwrr, ne.u.her mUitary nor publk press reaistered any similar 
ptOf'.IOWl<:emcnts durln¡ Cuco.a, D_t~·s p('Tlod. 
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AL any rnte. therc exist< the possibility tbat when hi¡;h and 
intermedia re leve! commanders cxecutc tasks o( cocrcion and 
those prescnbcd by CA progranu, they c•n bC<X>mc onsdous 
of cl<isting social prohlems and of the situaúon of dependcncy 
which alieoatcs natur.ol resourcc• and a whole sedes oí basi c 
inc.lustric, anc.l se.rviccs. This can rcsult in an lncrcased .ocúl 
sensitivily which aoes b.,yond the limits oí bourgeois-depend.""L 
nationalísm aod in 1he adoption uf patriotic-inde¡,endent atutu-
des with =pect to lmpcriali•m and democratic ones in the 
intcrn•l political context. 
Of course, this kind of mental transformation in many mi· 
litary meo will not come abou t cidusivcly bccausc ol their 
natural rcpulsion towards exor:uting reprcssivc actlons or be-
cause o( a superior educa lional and professional levt.l; ratber, 
such a transformation will dcpend on thc cnpacity of aura ction 
of progre.ssive and revolutionary force~. botb in the high and 
intcrmcdiate biei,1-r.hies as well "" amona the cnlisted mcn lf 
such a • return to the barreck• • could be obta'incd, it "'Ould 
conslitute a significant stcp forward towards nonnalíz:ing na · 
tional clvic life ; thc Consiiluuon clearly est abli shes the Army 's 
use only in <"xtraordinary cases of 1hc di<:1ppc.1rancc of legal 
powers in any stat.e or if Meidco should be threateocd bv an 
armed conflic1 wilb a forcign nation . 
' Righ1 now, 1hcre is uskin g place in Mexico an ocetlerated 
proccs5 of Mute monopoly capitalism (''). with till of its oonnal 
manif<'llations: lncrcasc in u nemploymen 1, conccntrotion ·of 
wcalth, t>tc. and in conscquence a pronounced prolctarization of 
,he peasan1s (''). a fundam enta l pilla r of Mexlco's politicai .Y· 
s tr.m. In addition, th,rc is an upansive and oombative inde-
pendent t.-.de unioo muvement, which sc1'Ves as a foco.J point 
in tbe constit ution anu strenghteoi ng of the pohtical partics oí 
oppos1Uon. lntimately related 10 all thls, iL Is necessary to 
mention the constant prohlems wi1hin 1he offici:,J "''Orker and 
pcasant mo,ement. In synthesis, little by little 1he pace is bcing 
(75) E.o.rique Sezno, • C-plt.albnio Monopo,lh:ta dt Ss:tado y Coyun1ura Po--
Udca •, tn Op0Jíd6n , No. 114 and 116. 
(76) Ro,er Baru, . • Y 5¡ tos Cam.pc_clmo, ¡e e,.1in11.1cn ... •. In HiJto,ria '1 
Soátcf44. Seoood E.poch. No. a. 1'76. Tbc. sarn,e aru..!~ •pptal'!> al10 i.o: Rr,,isto 
Mcxicanu d« StK:lolo1t• , Vol. JaXXVll, No. 2, Apr,,Jua. 1976. 
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~tepped up in the ¡>rocess of diss<>lu11on of rhc State's mechan-
isms of mcdl:,tion. 'fhe oomp lemen l of thls criti ca! cconomic 
aod pol11kal sirualion is n grca t ab,;cnce of democracy . 
Because of 1his criucal politir.nl situation, thcre have beco 
rumors al>out 1he poosibillty of a coup d'itat. We ~oincidc wilh 
th05e who offirm that, a1 least in die nea,· future ("). this would 
be the lasi reco,irse of the l>ourgeolsie and o[ irs Statc. In the 
long run , the ooly ahemniives appc¡,r to be: an interna) demo-
cra lizati on ora coup d'itar. Witb rcspect to the íirot possibility, 
bcc-.au,c th,s 13<:k oí dcmouacy has reac:hcd cven tlte naliona l 
milltla, thc Com01unist Party, ,o order to help foment a more 
dcmocratic environmcnt, (in additioo 10 othcr ncces..ary mea· 
sures: legalizatlon oí all polillca l pal'ties, generdl poU.ícai am 
nes1y, etc.) has askcd the Federal Electoral Commis•ion for 
lhe rcstoralion of políLir.oll nght• ro Lhe mcn in uníform , wbo 
werc deprived of these rights in 1952. 
The sccond alternativc, thc coup d'éror, would havc nn enor · 
mou• political cost, • the rnyth of thc S1a1c of the Mexican 
rcvolution would be ruined forever ,, as a well- know mexkan 
sociologist has observed, howcver , in rhc long run, thls same 
.<e.bolar points out an intcnnediate solution: 
Thc most probab le altern ative is that thc mexicao guvem-
mcnt wdl stubbornly insist in li\•ing on lost or every day 
more illusory mec haní.sms of mediotjon 1 on on institution · 
al po"'-er which louh for a solution in evreryooc, but 
which givcs the real excrcise of political power to very 
fcw This will also be a way to lts ruin , slower and less 
pa1nful 1han a cottp d'itat, less costly for sorne sectors 
of Lbc bourseoistc than a democra tic solution , but at 1hc 
samc time it could be rnore drama1ic, in thc scnsc that it 
could take thc society to those dangerous condilions of 
frust.r:ulon which provlde a good environmcnt for the 
cultívatioo of fascism ("). 
Certaln ,ymp1oms oí a possible proccs.. of democutizarion 
we,e prescnt throughout 1978 (electora l rcgistratíon of some op-
poshion partics, a relative degrcc of rcspect Cor !he.se political 
organlzations' activitics and n Jaw granting parUol amnesfy). 
(n) De la Pel!Jt, Op. Cu , p. 511. 
(71) B&nro, ()p . C!r., • Y ,J 1.. C.mpe1!nos. •. • , p. IJ 
\ 
Unfortunatdy. a complete normali?.auon of publ,c life ís very 
long and arduou s and no, irrev~rsible : this process has been 
ül'fset by a selective rcpression of independ en1 studen1. worktr 
and peasruu movements in d,fícrent re¡:ions as well a., by ar, 
irr1prc:.isive 1~'\SS·n1edia cnmpaign finaticed by national and ÍD· 
,ema tional conservativ• forces. The abscnse oí dernocracy for 
more than half a ccntury cannot be overcorne with restrict ecl 
changes; it is a Job of a inuch more amplc di mens,on . 
Even so . in moments of crisis, ,vhen general social conflicls 
can cause destrUctiv<.· convul!:lions within the Arn1y, it is neccs-
sary to remembe,- the factors that can neutrafü.e these c,>n-
vulsions: 
The leve! of instit utiona li,.ation ancl of profe,,lonalism 
and even more spedficaUy ,he ~ esprit de corps•. the 
cast sentiment . 1he poUtical assimilation and the poten· 
tia! social absorpt\on (whicb, by means nf an educational 
policy can 1·each even tite bask.ally peasan t elements of 
the Army) cm one hond, and the intensily wi1.h which 
the more general socio-polhical relations become po lar · 
ized. on the other, have show n to be the most decis ive 
corrective factors (") . 
'J'he 1'.1f'.xican Army does not havc a e.ns, seotimenl as a 
generic characte ristic. even lf a caSl or !lite does e.tisL Sud, 
a ,entimenl wlll grow if Lhere is a greater diffcrentiation betwee n 
the Army and the population in general , stimulated by mea.ns 
of greater fringe benefits ( which lead to more poli lical assimil· 
otion and to a poten tial social absorption which In Pres. Eche· 
verrfa's govcrnmcnt ( 1971-76) rncre•sed notobly, as well as the 
educatfona l process' intens iíication) . Ali oí this will signify a 
gr<!ater direct or indirect poUticcal p3rlicipli tion in publlc mat-
ters, reflected in the adquisiLion o! more prestige among petty 
bourgeoisie and bourgeois families, as now happens in otber 
nntions in Latin Arnerica 
From another point of view, wc cannot forget that, in c.on 
trnst with the major ity of Latin America's armics. the Mexican 
is the product of a revolutíon; m.any of its con1manders, evcn 
in the highest ranks , are of urban or mral proletarian origin, 
(79) Kossok, Op. Cil •• p. :N>l. 
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n spt.c iaJ cha rac1.eri~tic which must be taken in to consideratí .on 
·and i,; certai nly worthy of Í'uture study . It shou:id be enough 
to think in 1he differcnccs in soc.iaJ compositio n in lhe milita,y 
• intelligcntzia • in Perú and México, for example. 
Even though we cannot presently asccrtain the real weight 
of this characteris tic wilhin the militin . an undeniabl e reality 
líes in the fact that Presiden! Lópa Portillo ( 1977-84) has un der 
his command an Army wllh a well fom,ulatcd War Doctrine . 
highly profession,lized fnr íts princ ipal mission of coerdon and 
iriternal vigilancc; bul Sl lhc same tilne , ,vith a r;uperior political 
potenoiality and social seMitl'1ity, with a horizon clifferent from 
that of the traditional • gorilln. :.. No,v we bave thc « professio n~ 
alizcd gorilla •, or why not? the nr.w mUtlary man, conscious 
that rep ression will noL solve the working classs poliücal and 
ecooomic problems, nor will a complaccnt attüutle with respecl 
to Jm¡,1:rialism and its servile allies help fortify our nat ional 
i ndependencc. · 
In the conidors of the military schools we may be able 
to cncounter sorne nationalisu., along tbc lines of a , Velasco 
AJvarado » or sorne 1nc;:n in uniform evcn more a tune to the 
ti.mes, 1 he • Felipe Angeles ». 
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SOMMARY 
Tlu: aith:lc'a. cicnu·aJ n.bj«thrc COJUls11. first, lo nmktnll a. panon.mic pre,. 
&eo.tation ()f the Army iu a card.ioal o.raaniuiui,n lo lhc l!C>n!o1mation of MCUClj'• 
modero State :tod as a bac kup tnstituuon of the offic.i.a.t pan.y, which in turn 
OOC'tlpies a great portlcin oF the. ch1l socic.ty; sccundly, a detallcd proJccUon of 
oertain prufound profesg-lonal cllan¡ts wldc:h h•\•e oceum:d io the A.rl.ñy in 
an~e.r to dl(Cerent form, ot lbc dau struggle a.nd as fl ne.ccsi.lcy of maldn.a 
lt into a hlahl)' or¡a.nl.l.ed and coh.csjve o.raaniutlon of vwk nce wit.h.in lhc Sr.ere 
ls dlscus:sed. SimultanCOU$ly thb paper rcvea4 the impOrtance wLich U.S. 
milltary u.sistance ba.s _playell in thoM: c.han,es. as a ,ouree ot ota.anizationaJ 
techn1quei1 u welJ 111 of traini~ and 1tcliniotl~mUitary equ{pmen1. h under-
11.M* • speclfLc lnte.niction among ; cliss strugglo-m1Ut.ary profc\lórional l:unon. 
mUluny aid ot lmperia1i.sm. , 
1!>7 
